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THE HAWAII RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Addison M. Bowman· 
On January 1, 1981, the new Hawaii Rules of Evidence' took effect "in 
the courts of the State of Hawaii.'" Applicable generally in civil and crim-
inal cases, the rules are a comprehensive codification of principles of evi-
dence law resulting from a joint endeavor of the Judiciary of Hawaii and 
the Hawaii Legislature.8 The intent of the rules is "to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and pro-
motion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that 
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."· An-
other goal is to achieve uniformity in the treatment of evidence among 
the courts of the State. II The purpose of this article is to describe the 
• Professor of Law, University of Hawaii School of Law. A.B., Dartmouth College, 1957; 
LL.B., Dickinson School of Law, 1963; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1964. See 
note 3 infra for details of the author's work on Hawaii's evidence law. 
1 HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 626 (Supp. 1980). All the rules are collected in id. § 626-1 and are 
cited throughout this article as HAWAII R. Evm. 
• HAWAII R. EVID. 101. The rules apply to all courts in all proceedings except as provided 
in id. 1101. See Part IX infra. 
• The cooperative approach was designed in part to avoid a separation of powers struggle 
between the legislative and judicial branches of government. S. STAND. COMM. REp. No. 22-
80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1980); Richardson, Judicial Independence: The Hawaii 
Experience, 2 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Richardson). Initial 
impetus for evidence rules came from former State Representative Katsuya Yamada, who 
sponsored a bill in 1977, H.B. 22, 9th Hawaii Leg., 1st Sess. (1977). Legislative action was 
deferred pending study by a special Hawaii Judicial Council committee chaired by Honora-
ble Masato DoL Committee membership included Walter G. Chuck, David J. Dezzani, Marie 
N. Milks, Hideki Nakamura, Raymond J. Tam, and Stephen D. Tom. The author served as 
reporter to the committee and was ably assisted in preparing drafts and commentaries by 
John A. Spade. The judicial council committee proposed a draft of evidence rules that be-
came H.B. 1009, 10th Hawaii Leg., 1st Sess. (1979). Legislative action was again deferred 
pending interim study by a joint committee co-chaired by State Senator Dennis E. 
O'Connor and State Representative Dennis R. Yamada, the respective chairmen of the sen-
ate and house judiciary committees. Interim committee membership included State Senator 
Patricia F. Saiki and Representatives Russell Blair, Herbert J. Honda, Donna Ikeda, Ken-
neth Lee, Yoshiro Nakamura, and Katsuya Yamada. The author served as reporter to the 
interim committee, whose final product became S.B. 1827-80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. 
(1980). 
• HAWAII R. Evm. 102. Accord, FED. R. EVID. 102. 
• CONF. COMM. REP. No. 80-80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1980). 
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rules generally, to suggest interrelationships that may not be fully appar-
ent, and to underscore instances in which the rules effect changes in ex-
isting Hawaii law. 
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article I provides guidance for the courts in construing the rules and in 
determining questions of admissibility generally. The Federal Rules of 
EvidenceS served as the model for the Hawaii rules, and many of the rules 
are identical with or closely track their federal counterparts. The inter-
pretive commentary accompanying the federal rules7 thus will be useful 
in construing many of the Hawaii rules. In addition, the Hawaii rules 
have their own commentaries, which are published together with the rules 
in the Hawaii Revised Statutes.8 Hawaii rule 102.1 provides that these 
commentaries "may be used as an aid in understanding the rules, but not 
as evidence of legislative intent." 
Rule 102.1 is similar to a Hawaii Penal Code provision that limits the 
effect of the penal code commentary .. The principal purpose of these pro-
visions, according to the relevant penal code commentary, is to express 
"the strong judicial deference given legislative committee reports and 
other evidence of legislative intent authored by the Legislature or its 
staff."lO In other words, legislative committee reports,11 where applicable, 
• FED. R. EVlD. 101 to 1103, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Prelimi-
nary drafts of proposed federal evidence rules are found in 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), and 51 
F.R.D. 315 (1971). On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court prescribed Federal Rules of 
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Reporter's Note, 409 U.S. 1132 (1973); 
56 F.R.D. 184 (1972), which were thereafter modified and, as modified, finally approved by 
Congress in 1975, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. Some of the Hawaii 
rules, especially those relating to matters of privilege, are based on the Supreme Court's 
1972 proposals. Sources are in all instances noted in the Hawaii rules' commentaries. 
7 28 U.S.C. app., at 539-605 notes (1976) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed 
Rules). In addition, there are House, Senate, and Conference Committee Reports to the 
federal rules. H.R.CoNl'. REP. No. 93-1597, S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in (1974) U.S. CODB CONGo & An. NBws 7098, 7051; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 7075. See gener-
ally Symposium-The Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 634 (1976). For a com-
prehensive treatment of the federal rules, see 1-5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S 
EVIDENCE (1978-19BO) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE). 
• See S.B. 1827-BO, S.D. I, H.D. I, C.D. I, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. § 16 (19BO). 
• HAWAD REv. STAT. § 701-105 (1976). 
10 [d. commentary. 
11 The legislative history of the Hawaii rules is reflected in the original bill and each draft 
of the legislation which finally emerged as S.B. 1827-BO, S.D. I, H.D. 1, C.D. 1, 10th Hawaii 
Leg., 2d Sess. (19BO). The legislative reports are S. SPEC. COMM. REP. No.2, H. SPEC. COMM. 
REP. No.4, S. STAND. COMM. REP. No. 22-BO, H. STAND. COMM. REP. No. 712-80, CONI'. 
COMM. REP. No. BO-BO, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. (19BO). The senate report points out that 
"[a)lthough the commentary to the Hawaii Rules of Evidence will not reflect legislative in-
tent, it will provide discussions of the origin and supporting authorities for each rule, and in 
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are to be given primary and controlling weight in ascertaining legislative 
intent, and the commentaries are secondary in importance and authority. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently pointed out in reference to the penal 
code construction provision that "the commentary while not evidence 
thereof . . . is nevertheless expressive of the legislative intent. "Ill More-
over, the evidence rules commentaries, unlike the penal code commenta-
ries, were modified during the legislative session and were distributed to 
the legislators before their final action on the evidence rules package. 18 
Except in articles III and V, each of the commentaries specifies 
whether the rule is identical with or differs from its federal rule counter-
part and, where different, identifies the precise language variation. This 
mechanism provides the reader with an immediate answer to the question 
whether, and to what extent, the counterpart federal rule and its accom-
panying commentary and history will be useful as a further guide to stat-
utory construction. In addition, each commentary cites relevant prior Ha-
waii statutory and decisional law and indicates whether the prior law is 
preserved, modified, or entirely superseded by the new rule. 
Article III, dealing with presumptions, is largely based on the Califor-
nia Evidence Code treatment of presumptions'" and the article III com-
mentaries refer to the relevant California code provisions.U1 Article V, 
which contains the privilege rules, resembles the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dencel8 and the United States Supreme Court's proposed privilege rulesl7 
which were not approved by Congress but which contained commentaries 
that are appropriately mentioned in the article V commentaries. IS In 
short, there is a wealth of useful constructional material available to the 
consumers of this comprehensive legislative product. 
Rule 103, entitled "Rulings on evidence," governs the procedural con-
text for proffers, objections, and judicial rulings concerning items of evi-
dence in general. In addition, the rule establishes a harmless error stan-
dard by specifying that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party 
that manner function to provide the desired detailed discussions of these rules." S. STAND. 
COMM. REP. No. 22-80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1980). 
" State v. Alo, 57 Hawaii 418, 426-27, 558 P.2d 1012, 1017 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 
922 (1977); see State v. Aiu, 59 Hawaii 92, 98, 576 P.2d 1044, 1049 (1978); State v. Anderson, 
58 Hawaii 479,483 n.5, 572 P.2d 159, 162 n.5 (1977); State v .. Nobriga, 56 Hawaii 75, 77, 527 
P.2d 1269, 1273 (1974). 
I. Receipt of the commentaries was acknowledged in the conference committee report 
immediately preceding passage of the rules, CONF. COMM. REP. No. 80-80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 
2d Sess. 10 (1980). 
,. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 600-669 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980). 
I. See, e.g., HAWAII R. EVID. 301 commentary. I. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 209 (West 1980). 
17 See Fed. R Evid. 501-513, 56 F.RD. 230-61 (1972). The history of the federal rules is 
described briefly in note 6 supra. 
18 See, e.g., HAWAII R. EVID. 502 commentary. 
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is affected. "18 This provision mirrors comparable standards found in the 
Hawaii Supreme Court's civil and criminal procedure rules.ao Rule 103 is 
designed primarily to assure an adequate record, for appellate purposes, 
of any objection to the action of the trial court on an evidence point. If 
the trial court admits the questioned evidence, there must be "a timely 
objection or motion to strike. . . stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. "U If the trial 
court excludes proffered evidence, "the substance of the evidence . . . 
[must be] made known to the court by offer or ... [be] apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked."n The rule also directs 
the trial judge to conduct jury trials "so as to prevent inadmissible evi-
dence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making 
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the 
jury."as These elementary precepts are familiar to all experienced trial 
lawyers, but their recitation in the rules is designed to upgrade the gen-
eral practice before trial courts and to facilitate informed appellate review 
of evidence points. 
Rule 104, entitled "Preliminary questions," governs those situations 
where the judicial determination of admissibility of a particular evidence 
item depends upon the existence of specified foundational facts. For ex-
ample, many of the privilege rules in article V apply only when the con-
versation or communication in issue was intended to be confidential when 
spoken.s• Likewise, witnesses are qualified to testify, under rule 602, only 
when their testimony derives from "personal knowledge of the matter." 
Similarly, rule 804's exceptions to the hearsay ban require a preliminary 
determination that the declarant is "unavailable as a witness" as that 
phrase is defined in rule 804(a).111 Rule 104(a) specifies that such prelimi-
nary factual determinations are to be made by the judge and that in mak-
ing such determinations "the court is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect to privileges. "se 
'8 Id. 103(a). The timing of the court's ruling may contribute to the prejudicial effect of 
improper testimony. See Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., No. 6190, slip op. at 4-6 (Hawaii 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 1980). 
a·HAWAII R. CIY. P. 61; HAWAII R. PENAL P. 52(a) . 
• , HAWAII R. EVID. 103(a)(1) . 
•• Id. 103(a)(2). 
I. Id. 103(c) . 
.. See text accompanying notes 122, 127-32 infra. 
a. See text accompanying notes 244-65 infra . 
•• Rule 104(b), entitled "Relevancy conditioned on fact," establishes a limited exception 
to rule 104(a)'s allocation of preliminary fact determinations to the judge's province. In a 
few situations, the most obvious of which is the identification or authentication requirement 
as applied to real evidence in article IX, the relevance of a particular item, such as a docu-
ment, to a lawsuit depends entirely upon a foundational fact. In the document situation, the 
fact is authorship, which is determinative of relevance, not in the rule 401 sense but in an 
absolute sense; authorship is, however, also a condition of admissibility under rule 901. In 
this circumstance rule 104(b) entrusts the preliminary fact determination to the jury: 
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Entrusting preliminary questions to the court is standard common-law 
practice, but the question of applicability of the rules at this stage is a 
matter about which the common-law courts were unsettled.17 The com-
mentary to rule 104(a) quotes from the commentary to identical federal 
rule 104(a): "[T]he judge should be empowered to hear any relevant evi-
dence, such as affidavits or other reliable hearsay. This view is reinforced 
by practical necessity in certain situations. An item, offered and objected 
to, may itself be considered in ruling on admissibility, though not yet ad-
mitted in evidence."ls Thus, for example, a hearsay statement offered as 
an "excited utterance" under rule 803(b)(2) may itself evidence the rele-
vant foundational precondition that "the declarant was under the stress 
of excitement" when she spoke.1e Rule 104(c) requires that preliminary 
questions concerning admissibility of confessions be held outside the 
jury's hearing, and that other preliminary determinations similarly be re-
moved from jury notice "when the interests of justice require or, when 
the accused is a witness, if he so requests."ao 
Rule 105 deals with the situation, not infrequently encountered, where 
evidence "is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admis-
sible as to another party or for another purpose." A typical instance is the 
case where a party's prior admission is offered against him under rule 
803(a)al in a lawsuit involving multiple parties. As to other parties, the 
statement in question is inadmissible hearsay, and rule 105 accordingly 
provides that "the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." An example of evidence 
admissible for one purpose but not another is a prior inconsistent oral 
statement used to impeach the credibility of a witness under rule 613. 
The statement may be considered only in the credibility assessment and 
not to establish the truth of its contents,aa and the jury should be so in-
structed pursuant to rule 105. 
"When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a 
finding of the fulfillment of the condition." HAwAIJ R. Evm. 104 (b) (emphasis added). See 
generally Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435 (1980) . 
.. See MCCORMICK ON EIVDBNCE § 53, at 122-23 n.91 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 
1978) . 
.. 28 U.S.C. app., at 542 note (1976) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules), 
quoted in HAWAIJ R. Evm. 100(a) commentary. 
.. See note 229 infra. 
:10 See also HAWAIJ R. Evm. 412(c)(2) (in camera hearing on admissibility of rape victim's 
prior sexual conduct); HAWAIJ REv. STAT. § 707-742(a)(3) (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980) 
(closed hearing). See text accompanying notes 100-04 infra. 
U See text acCompanying notes 219-25 infra. 
IS 8ee text accompanying notes 170-75,210-15 infra. 
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II. JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Article II governs those situations where a court may declare a relevant 
fact or a proposition of law established without receiving evidence or 
proof. Rule 201 deals with judicial notice of adjudicative facts, and rule 
202 is concerned with judicial notice of law. 
Factual elements of claims or defenses are established typically through 
the introduction of evidence, and the rules of evidence are designed gen-
erally to provide criteria -and standards for admissibility determinations. 
Judicial notice of facts, however, dispenses with the requirement of evi-
dence and enables the court to "instruct the jury to accept as conclusive 
any fact judicially noticed."aa The criterion for such an action, according 
to rule 201(b), is that the fact "must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial juris-
diction of the trial court, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determina-
tion by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned." In other words, a fact judicially noticed must be virtually 
indisputable. In Almeida v. Correa, M an appeal from a determination of 
paternity, the trial court had instructed the jury that, subject to individ-
ual variations, the duration of a pregnancy is 270 days. This instruction 
was challenged on appeal because no evidence had been introduced to 
establish the proposition. The Hawaii Supreme Court approved the in-
struction because it "properly covered matters that were appropriate for 
judicial notice."aa "A fact is a proper subject for judicial notice," con-
cluded the court, "if it is common knowledge or easily verifiable."s8 Rule 
201 is to the same effect. 
Rule 201, as its title points out, deals with judicial notice only of "adju-
dicative" facts. As the commentary indicates, adjudicative facts are the 
facts relevant to the dispute between the parties. Another type of judicial 
notice, not treated in these rules or in the federal rules, concerns "legisla-
tive" facts, which include all the material that a court may consider when 
exercising its lawmaking function.lI7 
Almeida v. Correa again provides a useful example. In holding that a 
child cannot be exhibited to the jury for a resemblance comparison with 
the putative father on the issue of paternity, the supreme court surveyed 
the literature of genetics and physical anthropology to determine the gen-
eral relevance of resemblance evidence. Although the dissent argued that 
none of this literature had been subjected to adversary treatinent at the 
aa HAWAII R. EVID. 201(g). "In a criminal case, [however,) the court shall instruct the jury 
that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." Id. 
a. 51 Hawaii 594, 605, 465 P.2d 564, 571 (1970), discussed in Part IV infra. 
aa Id., 465 P.2d at 572 . 
.. Id. 
17 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 331 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978). 
1980-1981J HA WAll EVIDENCE CODE 437 
trial or appellate level,88 th~ majority quoted Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: "[TJhe court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a 
ground for laying down a rule of law."88 In State v. Brighter,40 the court 
sustained a presumption contained in the Hawaii Penal Code against con-
stitutional attack by noticing a New York legislative report that lent con-
siderable support to the penal code provision. Almeida and Brighter ex-
emplify the kind of material that trial and appellate courts may consider 
when making law, construing statutes, or deciding constitutional ques-
tions, but that should be distinguished from adjudicative facts treated in 
rule 201. . 
Rule 202, entitled "Judicial notice of law," enables the court to con-
sider the common law, Federal and State Constitutions, statutes, ordi-
nances, court rules and regulations, and foreign, international, and mari-
time law. Previous Hawaii statutory law was to the same effect except 
that foreign law was required to be pleaded and proved and could not be 
judicially noticed.41 
III. PRESUMPI'IONS 
Article III, which closely resembles comparable provisions in the Cali-
fornia Evidence Code," states the law of presumptions in civil and crimi-
nal cases~ Rule 301 sets forth definitions that are applicable only to the 
rules in this article. Rules 302 through 304 govern the operation of pre-
sumptions in civil cases. Rule 305 creates presumptions within the mean-
ing of article III in instances where external statutes provide that "a fact 
or a group of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact. "48 Rule 306 
controls the operation of all presumptions in criminal proceedings. 
Inferences are a staple ingredient in our adversary factfinding system, 
and they invariably involve assumptions of ultimate facts that triers of 
fact are invited to draw from basic facts proved by the parties. Items of 
inferential proof are commonly referred to as circumstantial evidence, 
and the pervasive question of relevance, addressed in article IV, is con-
cerned with the strength of the connection between basic and ultimate 
facts. Presumptions are a species of inference, but the distinction between 
the two is an important one. Inferences are permissive: "The trier of fact 
as 51 Hawaii at 606, 465 P.2d at 572 (Kobayashi, J., dissenting) . 
•• [d. at 597 n.l, 465 P.2d at 567 n.l (quoting Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 
548 (1924» . 
•• 61 Hawaii 99, 107-08, 595 P.2d 1072, 1077-78 (1979), discussed in text accompanying 
notes 59-62 infra . 
• , HAWAII REv. STAT. ch. 623 (1976) (repealed 1980) . 
•• See note 14 supra. See generally Symposium-Rebuttable Criminal and Civil Pre-
sumptions: California's Statutory Dichotomy, 9 U. CAL. D. 647 (1976) . 
.. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 707-761(2) (Supp. 1979) (extortionate credit transaction). See 
text accompanying notes 57-62 infra. 
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may logically and reasonably make an assumption from another fact or 
group of facts found or otherwise established in the action, but is not 
required to do so."" Presumptions are coercive: once the basic facts are 
established, the trier of fact is compelled to find the ultimate fact unless 
evidence of the nonexistence of the ultimate fact has been introduced.411 
For example, rule 303(c)(10) provides that "[a] letter correctly addressed 
and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary 
course of mail."'· If the proponent establishes to the satisfaction of the 
trier of fact that a letter was addressed correctly and mailed properly, 
and if no evidence of nonreceipt of the letter is presented, then the court 
must instruct the trier of fact to find that the addressee received the let-
ter. It is in this sense that rule 301(1) defines a presumption as "a rebut-
table assumption of fact. . . that the law requires to be made . . . from 
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the ac-
tion." In other words, a presumption necessarily imposes a burden of pro-
duction of evidence to escape a directed verdict or finding of the fact pre-
sumed. The reason, as Dean Charles T. McCormick pointed out, lies in an 
assumption about the strength of the connection between basic and pre-
sumed facts. n 
The principal difficulty with presumptions arises when the party 
against whom a presumption operates offers evidence of the nonexistence 
of the ultimate or presumed fact. One school of thought, reflected in the 
federal rules' treatment of presumptions, holds that in this circumstance 
the presumption is converted automatically into a permissive inference 
and has no impact on the previously allocated burden of proof with re-
spect to the ultimate fact.'· The contending theory is reflected in the Uni-
•• HAWAII R. EVID. 301(2)(8). This is precisely the operational force of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, which raises a rebuttable inference of negligence, see, e.g., Stryker v. Queen's 
Medical Center, 60 Hawaii 214, 587 P.2d 1229 (1978); Turner v. Willis, 59 Hawaii 319, 582 
P.2d 710 (1978) (both cases deal with jury instructions), discussed in Koshiba, Torts and 
Workers' Compensation, 1978 Survey of Hawaii Law, 2 U. HAWAII L. REv. 209, 223-26 
(1979), and should lead to a directed verdict where the evidence inescapably compels the 
inference of negligence, Winter v. Scherman, 57 Hawaii 279, 283, 554 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1976). 
•• The Statement applies only to presumptions in civil cases; criminal presumptions, 
which are always permissive, are discussed in text accompanying notes 56-62 infra . 
•• Cf. State v. Martin, No. 6934, slip op. at 12-13 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Aug. 19,1980) (uphold-
ing conviction based on evidence showing social security payments were correctly addressed 
to defendant to prove receipt of funds in theft prosecution for welfare fraud) . 
.. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 807 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as MCCORMICK]. 
•• Although the federal rule provides that a presumption imposes "the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption," FEn. R. EVID. 301, the Conference 
Report on the rule says that the effect is only "to get a party past an adverse party's motion 
to dismiss," H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7098, 7099. Even in the absence of rebutting evidence, the court 
should instruct the jury that "it may presume the existence of the presumed fact." [d. Thus, 
federal rule 301 arguably does not even create a presumption in the Hawaii rule sense. Pro-
fessor David W. Louisell points out that the quoted language "seems to confuse presump-
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form Rules of Evidence: "[A] presumption imposes on the party against 
whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the 
presumed fact is more probable than its existence. "49 The California 
scheme of presumptions commended itself to the drafters of the Hawaii 
rules because it recognizes both sorts of presumptions in a comprehensive 
classification system. Thus, Hawaii rule 302 specifies that in civil cases "a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed either (1) 
the burden of producing evidence, or (2) the burden of proof."'o Accord-
ingly, rule 303 sets forth those presumptions that impose only the burden 
of producing evidence, and rule 304 lists those that impose or shift the 
burden of proof. 
Why two schemes when one arguably would do? The reason is found in 
the arguments advanced by the competing schools of thought. Some pre-
sumptions, such as the one concerning receipt of a letter, have been es-
tablished because, in addition to probability considerations, direct evi-
dence of the ultimate fact is typically in the possession of the party 
against whom the presumption operates. These presumptions are 
designed primarily to shift the burden of producing evidence of the non-
existence of the presumed fact, but as soon as such evidence appears, the 
underlying policy has been implemented and there is no reason to shift 
the burden of proof. Presumptions of this class are defined in rule 
303(a)11 and collected in rule 303(c). The collection is not exclusive be-
cause presumptions are creatures of common-law evolution. Accordingly, 
subsection (c) lists fifteen presumptions and provides for inclusion of all 
others "established by law that fall within the criteria of subsection (a) of 
this rule."1t Subsection (b) defines the effect of a burden-of-production 
presumption: 
[T]he trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact 
unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its 
nonexistence, in which case no instruction on presumption shall be given and 
the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed 
tions with inferences," Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presump-
tions in Civil Actions and Proceedings, 63 VA. L. REV. 281, 289 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
Professor Louisell recommends that the courts disregard the Federal Conference Report be-
cause it "misapprehends the very issue to which it is addressed." Id. at 320. He recommends 
a comprehensive scheme for instructing juries about presumptions under federal rule 301. 
Id. at 305-20 . 
•• UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 301, in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 227 (West 1980). See 
generally Mueller, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions in Civil Cases: Comparing 
Federal Rule 301 with Uniform Rule 301, XII LAND & WATER L. REV. 219 (1977) (advocat-
ing the uniform rule). 
110 HAWAII R. EVID. 302(a)(1)-(2) . 
• , "A presumption established to implement no public policy other than to facilitate the 
determination of the particular action in which the presumption is applied imposes on the 
party against whom it is directed the burden of producing evidence." Id. 303(a) . 
•• Id. 303(c). 
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fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.&S 
On the other hand, a number of presumptions are designed to imple-
ment important public policies. A good example is found in rule 304(c)(7), 
establishing a presumption of death in the case of "[a] person who is ab-
sent for a continuous period of five years, during which time he has not 
been heard from, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained after 
diligent search or inquiry." This presumption is found also in the probate 
code,II4 and it facilitates the settlement and distribution of estates. The 
illustrative presumptions collected in rule 304(c) impose the burden of 
proof on the party against whom one of them operates: "Except as other-
wise provided by law or by these rules, proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence is necessary and sufficient to rebut a presumption established 
under ... [rule 304]."1111 Rule 304(a) establishes the criterion for classifi-
cation of unspecified presumptions that should be similarly treated, "im-
plement[ation of] a public policy other than, or in addition to, facilitating 
the determination of the particular action in which the presumption is 
applied." 
Litigants and judges should thus have little difficulty with civil pre-
sumptions under article III. The more commonly invoked ones are col-
lected in rules 303(c) and 304(c). Other presumptions can be readily clas-
sified according to the criteria of rules 303(a) and 304(a). Finally, the 
roles of court and trier of fact are specified in rules 303(b) and 304(b). 
Rule 306 is the exclusive vehicle for criminal presumptions. Subsection 
(b) provides that presumptions operating against the prosecution impose 
"either (1) the burden of producing evidence, or (2) the burden of 
proof,"lIs and the references are to rules 303 and 304. In other words, pre-
sumptions against the State are governed by the civil standards just dis-
cussed. Presumptions against the accused, "recognized at common law or 
created by statute, including statutory provisions that certain facts are 
prima facie evidence of other facts or of guilt, "117 are the subject of rule 
306(a). 
Rule 306(a)(3) makes clear that presumptions against an accused differ 
markedly from presumptions in civil proceedings: "The court may not di-
rect the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused." The result is 
that presumptions against the accused become special inferences that are 
commended to the jury by the court: "[T]he court shall instruct the jury 
that, if it finds the basic facts beyond a reasonable doubt, it may infer the 
presumed fact but is not required to do so. "118 This mandate comports 
•• [d. 303(b) . 
.. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560:1·107(3) (1976) . 
•• HAWAII R. EVID. 304(b) . 
.. [d. 306(b). 
07 [d. 306(a)(I) . 
.. [d. 306(a)(3). 
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with the due process standard recently enunciated by the Hawaii Su-
preme Court in State v. Brighter, e. a case where the appellant had been 
convicted with the assistance of a statutory provision to the effect that 
the presence of drugs in a motor vehicle "is prima facie evidence of know-
ing possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time 
the drug was found. "80 Applying this provision, the trial court had in-
structed the jury that "[p]rima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which 
if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the 
[presumed] fact, provided that no evidence negativing the fact, which 
raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, is introduced.''81 
This instruction, the Brighter court held, tended impermissibly to shift 
the burden of proof to the appellant and thus violated due process: 
"[Since] only permissive inferences may arise under ... [the statutory 
prima facie evidence provision], the jury should have been given a clarify-
ing instruction to the effect that it could-but was not required to-find 
the element of knowing possession upon proof of the underlying facts. "ell 
IV. RELEVANCE AND RELATED RULES 
Article IV defines the concept of relevance, establishes the general ad-
missibility of relevant evidence, and includes a number of specialized 
rules. Relevance is the basic precondition for the receipt of all evidence. 
Relevance is necessary but not always sufficient.A Rule 401 defines "rele-
•• 61 Hawaii 99, 595 P.2d 1072 (1979). Ct. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) 
(due process violated by jury instruction that "the law presumes that a person intends the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," where intent was element of crime charged). 
eo HAWAII REV. STAT. § 712·1251(1) (1976) . 
• , 61 Hawaii at 110, 595 P.2d at 1079 . 
.. [d. at 111, 595 P.2d at 1080 (original emphasis). Brighter in addition held that the 
presumption of knowing possession is constitutionally valid only as applied to "dealership 
quantities" of drugs: 
Therefore, we would require that the prosecution establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the quantity of drug involved is clearly greater than a quantity which may be pos. 
sessed for personal use. . . . Absent such a determination, a jury would not be justified 
in concluding that the statutory inference should be applied. 
[d. at 109·10, 595 P.2d at 1079. Brighter also addressed the question of the requisite 
strength between basic and ultimate facts in order to sustain a criminal presumption against 
constitutional attack. On this point, compare id. at 104·05, 109, 595 P.2d at 1076, 1078, with 
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 163-67 (1979) (reasonable doubt standard not constitu· 
tionally required where presence of firearm in automobile creates permissive presumption of 
illegal possession by all occupants) . 
• s HAWAII R. Evm. 402: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Hawaii, by statute, by these 
rules, or by other rules adopted by the supreme court. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Compare Michel v. Valdastri, Ltd., 59 Hawaii 53, 575 P.2d 1299 (1978) (error 
to disallow evidence that defendant violated Occupational Safety and Health Law (OSHL) 
to show negligence), with Taira v. Oahu Sugar Co., No. 6528 (Hawaii Ct. App. Sept. 12, 
1980) (OSHL regulations and expert testimony regarding safety precautions of defendant 
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vant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. "64 This 
definition mirrors the standard recently articulated by the Hawaii Su-
preme Court.811 
A question of relevance was one of the points on appeal in State v. 
Irebaria,88 where the defendants were arrested in an auto at 3:10 a.m. and 
charged with an armed robbery that had occurred at 2:10 a.m. Among the 
evidence of guilt admitted by the trial court were the following items: (1) 
Testimony that one of the robbers carried a .22 caliber pistol and fired a 
shot during the robbery; (2) testimony that the other robber carried a .38 
caliber revolver during the robbery; (3) a .22 caliber bullet fragment and a 
spent .22 caliber cartridge case found at the scene of the robbery; and (4) 
a .38 caliber revolver, a .22 caliber pistol, and some .38 and .22 caliber 
cartridges, all recovered from the trunk of the auto in which the defen-
dants were arrested. Appealing a robbery conviction, appellant challenged 
the receipt of the evidence recovered from his auto on the ground that it 
had no relevance because no scientific evidence had been presented to 
identify the weapons found in the auto as the robbery weapons; moreover, 
the prosecution did not establish that the seized weapons even could be 
fired. 
The Irebaria court rejected appellant's contention because the argu-
ment confused the concepts of relevance and sufficiency. Relevance, noted 
the court, requires only that the evidence possess a "legitimate tendency 
to establish a controverted fact.'te7 "A brick is not a wall,"88 quoted the 
court as it likened individually relevant items to building bricks and the 
sufficiency-of-evidence standard to a wall. The questioned items were not 
necessarily sufficient to support conviction but were relevant because of 
their tendency to identify appellant as one of the robbers. "The suffi-
properly excluded as irrelevant) . 
.. HAWAII R. EVID. 401; accord, FED. R. EVID. 401. See Kim v. State, _ Hawaii _,616 
P.2d 1376 (1980) (welfare records showing public school student's propensity for violence 
properly excluded as irrelevant to issue of awareness in suit against State for negligent su-
pervision resulting in serious injury to plaintiff, a classmate, because school authorities had 
no access to same records). So defined, relevance incorporates the old concept of materiality. 
Relevance was previously defined as "the tendency of the evidence to establish a material 
proposition." MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 185, at 435 (footnote omitted). The new defi-
nition includes the notion of materiality by specifying that the ultimate fact be "of conse-
quence to the determination of the action." HAWAII R. EVID. 401. Accordingly, as the com-
mentary points out, "the words 'material' and 'materiality' do not appear in these rules." [d. 
commentary . 
... "Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove a fact in controversy or renders a matter in 
issue more or less probable." State v. Smith, 59 Hawaii 565, 567, 583 P.2d 347, 349 (1978) . 
.. 55 Hawaii 353, 519 P.2d 1246 (1974) . 
• , Bonacon v. Wax, 37 Hawaii 57, 61 (1945), quoted in 55 Hawaii at 356, 519 P.2d at 1249 . 
.. MCCORMICk, supra note 47, at § 185, at 436, quoted in 55 Hawaii at 356, 519 P.2d at 
1249. 
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ciency standard should apply only when all the bricks of individually in-
sufficient [but relevant] evidence are in place and the wall itself is 
tested. "68 Rule 401 is to the same effect because it requires only that the 
proffered item have "any tendency" to establish or negate a consequential 
fact. 
Suppose, however, that the Irebaria defendants had been arrested in 
possession of the same arsenal not one hour but one year following com-
mission of the offense. The evidence would possess minimal relevance, 
and minimal relevance is all that rules 401 and 402 require. Rule 403, 
however, states an important qualifying principle that serves as a coun-
terbalance to the general permissiveness of rules 401 and 402: "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence,''''o It could be argued with 
some force that the minimal relevance on the legitimate issue of identity 
is substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury would be swayed 
in its decisional process by consideration of the general bad character of 
the defendants as gunslingers with some apparent use for guns, a consid-
eration strictly forbidden by the general character evidence ban of rule 
404.71 
Almeida v. Correa,7. discussed earlier in connection with the concept of 
judicial notice, provides another example. The principal question ad-
dressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Almeida was whether, in a pa-
ternity case, the exhibition of the child to the jury for resemblance com-
parison with the putative father had sufficient relevance. After a careful 
review of scientific principles in the fields of genetics and physical anthro-
pology, the court held that such an exhibition would be useless to a deter-
mination of paternity and could "only serve to expose ... [the putative 
father 1 to proven dangers,''''· In a footnote the court said that it was un-
•• 55 Hawaii at 356, 519 P.2d at 1249. Ct. State v. Lloyd, 61 Hawaii 505, 606 P.2d 913 
(1980) (police officer's assertion that seeds found in defendant's closet were marijuana seeds 
constituted insufficient evidence of the fact). 
10 HAWAD R. Evw. 403. Compare State v. Huihui, 62 Hawaii _, 612 P.2d 115 (1980) (sug-
gestion that defendant had prior criminal record by referring to "police mug photographs" 
in questioning witness regarding pretrial identification constituted reversible error), with 
State v. Pulawa, 62 Hawaii --. 614 P.2d 373 (1980) (reference to "mug shot" was harmless 
error), and State v. Antone, 62 Hawaii __ 615 P.2d 101, 107 (1980) (failure to object to 
evidence of defendant's prior arrest record for same type of crime was harmless in bench 
trial), and State v. Kahinu, 53 Hawaii 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 
(1973) (reference to prior arrest was harmless error where court immediately gave caution-
ary instruction). 
11 Cf. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930) (reversible error to admit 
evidence that defendant owned weapons, which were not used in the alleged crime, to per-
suade jury of his murderous propensity) . 
.. 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1970), discussed in Part IT supra . 
•• [d. at 603, 465 P.2d at 571. The court determined that the issue of specific resemblance 
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necessary to "balance probative weight against jury sympathy where 
there is no probative weight in an exhibition to a layman,"?· thus eschew-
ing reliance on the maxim expressed now in rule 403. Perusal of the Al-
meida opinion, however, suggests that the rule 403 principle would have 
been an equally appropriate ground for decision, especially in view of the 
fact that some other jurisdictions allow exhibition of the child in a pater-
nity case.76 The case also illustrates an obvious difficulty: relevance and 
prejudicial impact necessarily imply a degree of subjective judgment 
when all is said and done. Although the court relied on scientific exegesis 
in Almeida, most relevance questions require common-sense thinking 
about the relationships of things to other things. 
Another situation with significant potential for prejudice is presented 
when the court considers admitting evidence with a limiting instruction 
under rule 105.'76 Here the issue is whether probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger that the trier of fact will disregard the 
instruction and go on to consider the evidence for the forbidden purpose, 
evaluated with regard to the likelihood that such improper consideration 
will skew the result. Unfair prejudice, as the commentary to rule 403 
points out, "means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.''''7 Rule 403 
thus calls upon the court to anticipate and to evaluate the jury's probable 
mental operations with respect to a proffered item of evidence. Moreover, 
this judgment needs to take into account the relationship between the 
proffered item and other items already admitted or anticipated in evi-
dence, in addition to the general atmosphere at trial. It is for these rea-
sons that the 403 balance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 
Rules 401, 402, and 403 are fundamental and pervasive. They are the 
backbone of the entire body of evidence law. 
Rules 404 and 405 are concerned with character evidence. That a per-
son behaved in a certain way on a particular occasion could be shown, 
given the rule 401 definition, by evidence of her general character or pro-
pensity to behave that way on any like occasion. Character could be 
proved in two ways: witnesses could be called to state their opinion of the 
person's character or their knowledge of her reputation for a particular 
trait of character, or evidence could be offered that on occasions other 
than the one in question she behaved in a manner consistent with the 
proponent's theory of her behavior on the occasion in question.'78 Rule 
is relevant in determination of paternity but only where resemblance is measured scientifi-
cally. Therefore, only expert testimony on the issue would be admissible. Id. at 602-03, 465 
P.2d at 570-71. 
,. Id. at 603 n.ll, 465 P.2d at 570 n.ll. 
1. MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 212, at 526 n.20. 
.. See the discussion of rule 105 in Part I supra . 
.. HAWAII R. EVID. 403 commentary (quoting 28 U.S.C. app., at 550 note 1976». 
,. Specific instances of prior conduct are a species of character evidence because the con-
nection between the prior conduct and the conduct in issue requires an intervening infer-
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404, however, interposes a general bar, with limited exceptions, to charac-
ter evidence because, as the commentary to the rule explains: 
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It 
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually hap-
pened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward 
the good ... [woman] and to punish the bad ... [woman] because of their 
respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually 
happened.79 
So understood, rule 404 represents a specialized application of the 403 
principle. 
The exceptions to rule 404(a)'s character evidence exclusion are that 
(1) the accused in a criminal case can offer evidence of a personal trait 
inconsistent with commission of the crime charged,80 (2) the character of 
certain crime victims can be proved by accused81 in criminal cases,8' and 
(3) the character of witnesses to be untruthful or, in limited circum-
stances, to testify truthfully can be proved under rules 608 and 609.83 In 
these limited instances, rule 405 specifies that the proof may be by repu-
tation or by direct opinion evidence but generally not by instances of con-
duct on other occasions. The common law did not allow proof of character 
by opinion, and, consistent with federal rule 405, this rule thus effects a 
change in Hawaii law.84 
Rule 404(b) precludes the use of specific instances of conduct ("other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts") "to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith. "811 The rule typically bars the 
ence or assumption of character or propensity for that particular kind of behavior. 
7. HAWAII R. EVID. 404 commentary (quoting 28 U.S.C. app., at 551 note (1976) (Notes of 
Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules) (quoting CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMEN-
DATION & STUDIES 615 (1964»). 
80 HAWAII R. EVID. 404(a)(I) . 
• 1 [d. 404(a)(2). Proof of character of rape and sex assault victims, however, is governed 
exclusively by rule 412. See text accompanying notes 100-04 infra. It thus appears that rule 
404(a)(2) relates primarily to self-defense claims in homicide and assault cases, e.g., State v. 
Lui, 61 Hawaii 328, 603 P.2d 151 (1979) . 
• 2 In Feliciano v. City & County of Honolulu, 62 Hawaii _, 611 P.2d 989 (1980), a civil 
action for assault and battery brought under the theory of respondeat superior, the court 
approved evidence of the reputation of plaintiffs for violence to support the employer's as-
sertion that its police officers reasonably feared bodily harm and to evidence plaintiffs' char-
acter and propensity to be aggressive. Although the analogy to rule 404(a)(2) in Feliciano is 
powerful because of the similarity between civil and criminal assault cases, rule 404 does not 
support the Feliciano result . 
• 3 HAWAII R. EVID. 404(a)(3). See text accompanying notes 146-67 infra . 
.. See State v. Faafiti, 54 Hawaii 637, 642-44, 513 P.2d 697, 701-02 (1973) (no error where 
trial court refused to admit testimony either as evidence of defendant's reputation in the 
community or as personal opinion testimony as to accused's character) . 
•• Cf. Warshaw v. Rockresorts, Inc., 57 Hawaii 645, 562 P.2d 428 (1977) (evidence of prior 
golf cart accidents properly excluded in damage suit based on negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict liability theories). 
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prosecutor from proving that the defendant committed other crimes to 
p,vidence his probable commission of the one charged.88 Many exceptions 
have been engrafted to the rule: other crimes evidence "may, however, be 
admissible where such evidence is probative of any other fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus oper-
andi, or absence of mistake or accident."87 Illustrative of these exceptions 
is State v. Apao,88 where the defendant was charged with the murder of a 
man "known by ... [the defendant] to be a witness in a murder prosecu-
tion. "811 At trial the State was permitted to prove that the prior murder 
prosecution involved the current victim as witness and Apao as defen-
dant. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that this evidence was properly 
admitted to evidence Apao's motive to kill the man who testified against 
him in the previous case. The holding is consistent with rules 403 and 
404(b) because the prejudicial impact of the evidence did not outweigh its 
legitimate value in the two-step inference from prior crime to motive to 
present guilt. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court has previously employed two formulations 
of the "other crimes" rule; one, an exclusionary rule with exceptions re-
sembling rule 404(b); the other, an apparently more permissive device al-
lowing general admissibility "except when ... [the evidence] shows 
merely criminal disposition.''" Federal rule 404(b) adheres to the exclu-
sionary formulation with exceptions, and the Hawaii rule is similar but 
was adaptedlll to embrace the essential spirit of both formulations. In any 
event, the precise language of the rule, as the Hawaii court has recog-
nized, should always yield to the trial court's paramount obligation in as-
sessing "relevancy to proof of an element of the crime charged, 
balanc[ing] ... probative value against prejudicial effect, and [using] 
... the exception categories primarily as indices of relevancy."1I1 The 
court thus recognized that the principles now codified in rules 403 and 
404(b) are interdependent in the consideration of "other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts" evidence . 
.. See, e.g., State v. Pokini, 57 Hawaii 17, 548 P.2d 1397 (1976) . 
•• HAWAII R. Evm. 404(b). See State v. Thompson, 1 Haw. App. _, 613 P.2d 909 (1980) 
(evidence that defendant forged check endorsement of one hospital patient admissible to 
prove element of intent in forgery prosecution involving another patient's check) . 
.. 59 Hawaii 625, 586 P.2d 250 (1978) . 
•• [d. at 627, 586 P.2d at 253. 
10 People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 314, 169 P.2d 924, 929 (1946), quoted in State v. 
Iaukea, 56 Hawaii 343, 349, 537 P.2d 724, 729 (1975). See State v. Agnasan, 62 Hawaii _, 
614 P.2d 393 (1980); State v. Murphy, 59 Hawaii 1, 8-11, 575 P.2d 448, 454·56 (1978). 
II The permissive sentence in the federal rule reads: "It may, however, be admi88ible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive .... " FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added). The 
Hawaii formulation substitutes "where such evidence is probative of any other fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action," HAWAII R. EVID. 404(b), for the italicized 
phrase in the federal rule. 
a. State v. Iaukea, 56 Hawaii 343, 351, 537 P.2d 724, 730 (1975). 
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The Hawaii drafters also added "modus operandi" to the catalog of 
rule 404(b) exceptions. This is an appropriate addition because in a given 
case the details of commission of the prior crime and of the crime charged 
may be so strikingly similar and distinctive "as to be like a signature."lIs 
Dean McCormick cautioned, however, that "much more is demanded 
than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as 
repeated burglaries or thefts. ''114 This is because repetitious criminality 
demonstrates nothing more than forbidden bad character or propensity. 
The theory of the modus operandi exception is that two crimes may pos-
sess such distinctive similarities as to mark them the probable handiwork 
of the same person, thereby identifying the defendant as the present 
culprit.lI11 
Most of the remaining rules in article IV state settled principles.IIG For 
example, rule 406 provides that when prior instances of conduct amount 
to a habit or "routine practice," then evidence of the habit or practice is 
admissible "to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a 
particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice." 
"Subsequent remedial measures," such as equipment repairs or em-
ployee discharges, effected after an occurrence currently being litigated, 
generally are prohibited by rule 407 to prove "negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event." Rule 407 contains exceptionsll7 and 
goes beyond federal rule 407 in allowing subsequent remedial measures to 
prove "dangerous defect[s] in products liability cases." As the commen-
tary points out, this action codifies the result reached by the California 
Supreme Court in Ault v. International Harvester CO.,IIB where the trial 
court admitted subsequent repairs made t6 the International Scout in a 
•• MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 190, at 449 (footnote omitted) . 
.. Id . 
•• See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723, 725-26 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 883 (1961); 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 11 404[09], at 404-52 to -55 (1980) . 
.. Rule 408 bars evidence of "compromise or offers to compromise"; rule 409 excludes 
evidence of "payment of medical and similar expenses"; rule 410 interdicts evidence of with-
drawn guilty pleas, nolo contendere pleas, and plea bargaining statements; and rule 411 
. bans evidence of liability insurance on the issue of negligence. See also State v. Alberti, 61 
Hawaii 502, 605 P.2d 937 (1980) (where withdrawal of guilty plea was pending in federal 
court, admissions made to support plea are admissible in subsequent state prosecution for 
related offense arising out of the same conduct but would not be admissible after federal 
court approved withdrawal). 
t7 Impeachment is one of the exceptions. Accord, Lon:g Mfg., N.C., Inc. v. Nichols Tractor 
Co., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) (post-accident warn-
ing letter to customers admissible to impeach defendant's witness who testified to safety of 
tractor design in wrongful death action based on negligence theory). 
18 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974). Plaintiff claimed that the 
manufacturer's use of aluminum rather than malleable iron in construction of the gear box 
constituted a design defect that Caused the gear box to break and the vehicle to lurch out of 
control and plunge 500 feet to the bottom of Nine Mile Canyon Road. Defendant substi-
tuted iron for aluminum in the manufacture of Scout gear boxes three years after the acci-
dent occurred. 
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products liability case. The California court recognized that the general 
p.xclusion of subsequent repairs evidence is designed to encourage, or at 
least not discourage, the making of repairs but held that the principle had 
no applicability in products liability cases: 
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal products lia-
bility defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of goods; it is mani-
festly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego making improve-
ments in its product, and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and the 
attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because evidence of 
adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an action founded on strict 
liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement." 
Rule 412 tracks a recent addition to the federal rules100 and sharply 
limits evidence of the previous sexual behavior of rape and sex assault 
victims.101 Prior Hawaii law entrusted the determination of admissibility 
of this kind of evidence -to the discretion of the trial COurt,101l and the 
evidence was sometimes admitted to establish that the victim consented 
to the alleged crime of rape or sodomy. Rule 412 excludes evidence of 
past sexual behavior of sex assault victims with persons other than the 
accused103 but leaves open the door to evidence of prior sexual conduct 
with the accused in cases where the defense of consent is raised. This rule 
take precedence ov.er the general victim character provision of rule 
404(a)(2)/04 and recognizes that the evidence now excluded had little or 
no relevance on the consent issue. Moreover, the evidence was degrading 
to rape and sex assault victims, and its availability was thought to deter 
significant numbers of them from reporting these crimes . 
.. [d. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816. 
100 Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046, 
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app., at 1231 (Supp. III 1979) (FED. R. EVID. 412). 
101 Rule 412 also flatly prohibits "reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behav-
ior" of such victims. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
102 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-742 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980). See State v. Iaukea, 
No. 6440 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1980). 
loa The only exceptions are instances where the evidence is offered "upon the issue of 
whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen 
or injury," HAWAII R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A); and where the evidence is "constitutionally re-
quired to be admitted," id. 412(b)(1). Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (confrontation 
clause protects defendant's right to cross-examine juvenile regarding his status as a proba-
tioner in order to show witness' bias); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) (vacating post-
conviction affirmance where trial court barred evidence of rape prosecutrix' status as proba-
tioner and relevant sexual history); State v. Jones, No. 6321, slip op. at 6-11 (Hawaii Sup. 
Ct. Oct. 7, 1980) (trial court properly excluded evidence of rape victim's prior sexual experi-
ence with another person as irrelevant to consent defense and witness' credibility). 
I.. See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra. 
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v. PRIVILEGES 
Article V contains a comprehensive set of privilege rules that clarify 
but do not modify significantly previous Hawaii law. The federal rules 
contain no specific rules on privilege, although the original package of 
proposed federal rules, submitted by the United States Supreme Court to 
the Congress in 1972, contained thirteen privilege rulesloll upon which the 
Hawaii rules are largely based. For a number of reasons, Congress scut-
tled the proposed privilege rules in favor of a single standard,106 federal 
rule 501, that entrusts the matter of privilege in the federal courts to "the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and experience."107 The Uniform 
Rules of Evidence, on the other hand, contain a set of twelve privilege 
rules,l06 most of which are textually similar to the un enacted federal rules 
and to the rules contained in Hawaii's article V. 
Rule 501 states the basic principle that no privileges are to be recog-
nized "[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
States, the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, or provided by Act of 
Congress or Hawaii statute, and except as provided in these rules or in 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii." This 
truism embodies the idea that every person must respond to court process 
and provide relevant evidence unless a specific privilege can be estab-
lished.loe The article V collection includes the well-established lawyer-cli-
••• Fed. R. Evid. 501-513, 56 F.R.D. 230·61 (1972) . 
• " The original privilege rules were the most controversial part of the Supreme Court's 
submission, see note 6 supra. Critics charged that the privilege rules were matters of sub-
stance and, as such, without the Court's power to prescribe "practice and procedure" rules; 
that the rules impinged on state law and policy and hence violated the principle of federal-
ism; and that the rules would "freeze" the federal privilege law. Specific provisions were 
attacked. "The controversy convinced Congress that codification of privileges was dangerous 
and might forestall passage of the rules." 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 11 
501[01], at 501-17 (1980) (footnote omitted). The result was enactment of a single rule, FED. 
R. EVID. 501, discussed in text above. For a discussion of relevant judicial rulemaking power 
in Hawaii, see Richardson, supra note 3, at 33-38. 
'0'7 FED. R. EVID. 501. The rule also provides that, "in civil actions and proceedings, with 
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of deci-
sion, the privilege of a witness ... shall be determined in accordance with State law." Id . 
• 08 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 501-512, in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 248-66 (West 
1980) . 
• 08 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686, 688 (1972). In addition rule 501 
bars common-law development of new privileges. Compare Riley v. City of Chester, 612 
F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (common-law news reporter privilege), with In re Goodfader, 45 
Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961) (declining to create news reporter privilege). The recently 
adopted constitutional amendment protecting the right to privacy, HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 6, 
may provide an independent basis for excluding evidence. The 1978 amendment is a combi-
nation of similar provisions in the Alaska and Montana constitutions, Comm. on Bill of 
Rights, Suffrage and Elections, Informational Panel Minutes, 3d Hawaii Const. Conv. 1 
(1978) (remarks of Professor Jon Van Dyke) (on file at Hawaii State Archives). See ALASKA 
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ent,110 physician-patient,111 spousal, WI clergywoman-penitent,118 political 
vote,114 trade secret,111 self-incrimination,118 and informer's identity117 
privileges. In addition, rule 504.1 presents a psychologist-client privilege, 
applicable to psychologists certified under the Hawaii statutes118 and 
their patients or clients. The purpose of these rules is to facilitate com-
munication and to protect privacy.l19 
The lawyer-client, physician-patient, psychologist-client, and clergy-
man privileges, found in rules 503, 504, 504.1, and 506, respectively, are 
similar in nature. All provide that the person who seeks advice or coun-
selling is the holder and beneficiary of the privilege and that both parties 
to the privileged material may claim the privilege but only on behalf of 
the holder.lIIO Accordingly, all provide that the definition of the profes-
sional person includes not only one authorized or certified to engage in 
his calling but also one "reasonably believed" by the client or patient to 
be so authorized.1I1 All specify that the subject matter of the privilege is 
limited to confidential communications, and all define confidential com-
munications as those made privately and "not intended to be disclosed" 
to other persons except when disclosure would be in furtherance of the 
CaNST. art. I, § 22; MONT. CaNsT. art. II, § 10. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected a crimi-
nal defendant's claimed psychotherapist privilege for lack of state action, Allred v. State, 
554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976) (establishing common-law psychotherapist privilege but finding 
it inapplicable under the circumstances), but the Montana Supreme Court has invoked the 
exclusionary rule even to protect against invasion of privacy by private parties, State v. 
Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974); State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 
(1971). See also State v. Boynton, 58 Hawaii 530, 574 P.2d 1330 (1978) (declining to decide 
whether searches by private parties may be subject to the exclusionary rule as in Coburn). 
110 HAWAII R. EVID. 503. For an extensive discussion of the question whether a client's 
whereabouts is privileged material, see Sapp v. Wong, 62 Hawaii _, _, 609 P.2d 137, 140-41 
(1980) (information not privileged under the circumstances). 
111 HAWAII R. EVID. 504. 
111 Id. 505. 
111 Id. 506. 
lit Id. 507. 
JU Id. 508 . 
... Id. 509. 
lIT Id. 510. 
11. Id. 504.1(a)(2). See HAWAII REv. STAT. ch. 465 (1976 & Supp. 1979), as amended by 
Act 91, 1980 Hawaii Sess. Laws 141. See text accompanying note 121 infra. 
110 The privilege rules constitute a major qualification to the rule 402 maxim that all 
relevant evidence is admissible, see note 63 supra. Because of this, and because the specific 
privileges also create exceptions to the limiting principle of rule 501, construction of the 
privilege rules will call for balancing the privilege policies against the general propositions of 
rules 402 and SOL Specific privilege policies are elaborated in the commentaries to the indi-
vidual privilege rules. Article five, of course, contains the only evidence rules binding upon 
the court in hearing preliminary matters, see text accompanying note 26 supra. 
110 In the case of lawyers, rule S03(c) directs: "The person who was the lawyer or the 
lawyer's representative at the time of the communication shall claim the privilege on behalf 
of the client unless expressly released by the client." 
III HAWAII R. EVID. 503(a)(3), 504(a)(2), 504.1(a)(2), 506(a)(1). 
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object of the consultation. IlII All except the clergyman privilege contain a 
standard list of exceptions. Finally, all provide that the privilege survives 
the death of the privilege holder. 
The lawyer-client privilege applies to corporations when they seek or 
obtain professional legal services.118 There is a good deal of case law on 
the question who, among all the employees of a corporation, embodies or 
speaks for the corporation when interviewed by a lawyer, as contrasted 
with employees who are interviewed merely as witnesses to events about 
which the corporation may anticipate litigation. Rule 503 answers this 
question by specifying that "representative[s] of the client" include only 
those "having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on 
advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client."1lI4 This formu-
lation is recommended in the Uniform Rules of Evidence,1lI1i and it resem-
bles the "control group" test rejected in 1981 by the Supreme Court in 
Upjohn Co. v. United States. I •• 
The spousal privilege has two discrete aspects. Rule 505(a), applicable 
only in criminal cases, provides "the spouse of the accused [with] a privi-
lege not to testify against the accused." This modifies prior Hawaii law, 
which allowed either the accused or the testifying spouse to invoke the 
criminal disqualification,I17 thereby flatly barring testimony. The Hawaii 
drafters were persuaded by the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Trammel v. United States,118 which held, as a matter of common-
law development, that a criminal accused could not prevent his spouse 
from testifying against him. The purpose of the privilege is the protection 
of marital harmony, and the Trammel Court reasoned that whenever one 
spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal case "there is 
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to pre-
... [d. 503(a)(5), 504(a)(3), 504.1(a)(3); accord, 506(a)(2). 
I.' [d. 503(a)(I). 
I.' [d. 503(a)(2) . 
... UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 502(a)(2), in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 249 (West 
1980). 
, •• 49 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 79-886). Hawaii's rule is based on City of 
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485-86 (E.D. Pil.), petition lor 
mandamus and prohibition denied Bub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), which denied the privilege where the mat-
ter discussed with the corporation's attorney was very important to the highest management 
level, and the employee had no substantial decisionmaking role in it. 
I., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 621-18 (1976) (repealed 1980), provided that spouses were not 
"competent or compellable" to give evidence against each other in criminal cases, except 
where the offense involved a crime against the person of the other spouse or either of their 
children. See Territory v. Alford, 39 Hawaii 460 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1953) 
(wife competent to testify against husband accused of forcing her into prostitution). 
I •• 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The petitioner's spouse had been granted use immunity to testify 
against her husband who was charged with importing and conspiring to import heroin. Upon 
her return from Thailand, Mrs. Trammel was arrested in Hawaii after a customs search 
revealed she was carrying four ounces of heroin. She was later named as an unindicted co-
conspirator in her husband's case. 
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serve."129 For this reason, Hawaii rule 505(a) provides that the disqualifi-
<:ation "may be claimed only by the spouse who is called to testify." Rule 
505(b), applicable in civil as well as criminal cases, creates a privilege for 
"confidential marital communications"lso and specifies that either spouse 
"has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing [such a] communication."lsl The exception to the privi-
leges of rule 505(a) and (b) applies whenever one spouse is charged with a 
crime against the other or against other household members.1S2 
Rule 511 generally provides that a privilege is waived if the holder "vol-
untarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the 
privileged matter." Rule 512 bars evidence of privileged material if "dis-
closure was (1) compelled erroneously, or (2) made without opportunity 
to claim the privilege." Finally, rule 513 prohibits comment by court or 
counsel about the fact that a person, "whether in the present proceeding 
or upon a prior occasion," claimed a privilege. ISS Since no inferences may 
be drawn by the trier of fact concerning a privilege claim, rule 513(c) 
specifies that "any party exercising a privilege (1) is entitled to an in-
struction that no inference may be drawn therefrom, or (2) is entitled to 
have no instruction on the matter given to the jury." This latter entitle-
ment effects a change in Hawaii law, because the supreme court had held, 
in State v. Baxter,l34 that it was not reversible error for the trial court to 
deliver such a cautionary instruction even over the objection of an ac-
cused who availed himself of the self-incrimination privilege not to tes-
tify. The new rule embodies Justice Kazuhisa Abe's dissenting view in 
Baxter to the effect that the decision ·about the cautionary instruction 
should belong to the privilege claimant, especially since the instruction is 
viewed by many trial lawyers as a more-detrimental-than-beneficial spot-
lighting of the privilege claim. lao 
, •• Id. at 52. Cf. In re Grand Jury Empanelled Oct. 18, 1979,49 U.S.L.W. 2066 (3d Cir. 
June 26, 1980) (co-conspirator spouse entitled to claim privilege). 
,ao HAWAII R. EVID. 505(b). Such a privilege was previously recognized by statute, HAWAII 
REV. STAT. § 621-19 (1976) (repealed 1980). The Supreme Court in Trammel acknowledged 
the same independent privilege for confidential communications, 445 U.S. at 51, and ex-
pressly noted that its ruling did not "disturb" that well-established law, id. at 45 n.5. 
U1 HAWAII R. EVID. 505(b)(2). 
, •• Id. 505(e): This comports with prior statutory and case law, see note 127 supra. 
II. HAWAII R. EVID. 513(a). The Hawaii Supreme Court ~ad previously prohibited com-
ment in a civil case on the assertion of the self-incrimination privilege, Kaneshiro v. Be-
lisario, 51 Hawaii 649, 652, 466 P.2d 452, 454 (1970). In criminal cases, prohibition of com-
ment about the accused's assertion of the self-incrimination privilege is a constitutional 
imperative, see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The prosecution may, however, 
comment upon the failure of defendant to offer the spouse as a witness to any fact material 
to the defense. State v. Hassard, 45 Hawaii 221, 228, 365 P.2d 202, 206 (1961). 
'34 51 Hawaii 157,454 P.2d 366 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 955 (1970); accord, Lakeside 
v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340-41 (1978). 
, .. 51 Hawaii at 161, 454 P.2d at 368 (Abe, J., dissenting). 
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VI. WITNESSES AND IMPEACHMENT 
Article VI covers competency, impeachment, and other matters relating 
to witness interrogation. One of the most innovative provisions in the en-
tire Code is rule 607: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by 
any party, including the party calling him." Previous practice precluded a 
party from impeaching her own witnesses except in limited circum-
stances.188 She was said to vouch for the credibility of the witnesses she 
called, and impeachment hardly comports with the voucher notion. An-
other formulation of the voucher concept considered a party to be 
"bound" by the testimony of her witnesses. The notion of being bound, 
however, did not prevent a party from calling witnesses who would testify 
at variance with each other. In a somewhat circular way, the notions of 
vouching and being bound were mainly effectuated in the impeachment 
limitation. Dean McCormick viewed this limitation as "a serious obstruc-
tion to the ascertainment of truth" in the context of modern litigation 
where parties do not choose their witnesses but rather take them where 
they find them.18'7 Federal rule 607, with which the Hawaii rule is identi-
cal, abandoned the limitation as "based on false premises. "138 Most of the 
states that have reexamined evidence rules since 1975, when the federal 
rules were promulgated, have similarly interred the own-witness impeach-
ment bar.18s No grievances have been heard. The burials have been quiet 
and dignified. 
Rules 601 through 606 relate to witness competency and largely restate 
existing law. Rule 601 proclaims that "[e]very person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." Rule 602 requires 
that witnesses testify from personal knowledge of the subject matter of 
their testimony, and rule 603 mandates an "oath or affirmation adminis-
tered in a form calculated to awaken ... [the witness'] conscience and 
impress his mind with his duty to ... [testify truthfully]." Because of 
the apparent sweep of rule 601, the Hawaii drafters incorporated, in rule 
603.1, a provision from the California Evidence Code disqualifying as a 
witness any person who is incapable of expressing himself or incapable of 
understanding the truth-telling obligation.140 This provision, as the com-
mentary points out, will be primarily applicable to youthful and mentally 
infirm witnesses. 141 
Rules 605 and 606 render judges and jurors incompetent to testify in 
the trials in which they sit. Rule 606(b) governs juror testimony about 
... HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621-25 (1976) (repealed 1980) . 
... MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 38, at 77 . 
... 28 U.S.C. app., at 561 note (1976) . 
... The statutes are collected in 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 11 607(10] 
(Supp. 1979) . 
. <. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 701 (West 1966); HAWAII R. EVID. 603.1 commentary . 
• <. See State v. Antone, 62 Hawaii _, _, 615 P.2d 101, 106-07 (1980). 
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jury deliberations: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indict· 
ment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. 
This is a modification of the federal rule which additionally prohibits tes-
timony concerning "any matter or statement occurring during the course 
of the jury's deliberations."ul The Hawaii rule will allow testimony about 
events that occur in the jury room, the disqualification being limited to 
testimony about the "effect" of such events on jurors' deliberative reason-
ing. The difference is suggested by Kealoha v. Tanaka,143 where a deliber-
ating jury repaired to the Halekulani Hotel, consumed alcoholic bever-
ages, and thereafter returned a hasty verdict. Although the Kealoha 
holding did not relate to juror competency /44 the case is mentioned here 
because the jurors would not be competent to testify about their drinking 
activities under the federal rule but would qualify under the Hawaii rule. 
Both rules would bar testimony concerning the effect of the drinking on 
the deliberations, however. The policy, according to the commentaries to 
both rules, is to promote "freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of 
verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrass-
ment. "1411 The Hawaii drafters nevertheless concluded that objective 
forms of juror misconduct should not be insulated from subsequent 
scrutiny. 
Rules 608, 609, 609.1, and 613 govern impeachment. Rules 608 and 609 
define the scope of permissible character attacks on witness credibility.ulI 
Rule 608 permits a credibility attack through opinion or reputation evi-
dence of the character of a witness for lack of veracity, and, to rebut such 
an attack, allows credibility support by opinion or reputation evidence of 
character for truthfulness.14" Rule 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic 
evidence to prove a witness' prior behavior as it may bear on his credibil-
ity but approves cross-examination concerning such prior behavior. This 
formulation is often expressed as follows: The cross-examiner may inquire 
about the witness' employment, prior conduct, and other collateral cir-
cumstances bearing on credibility but is. concluded by the answers and 
... FED. R. EVID. 606(b) . 
• 41 45 Hawaii 457, 370 P.2d 468 (1962) . 
••• The court held that consumption of liquor by the jurors did not, as a matter of law, 
constitute prejudice requiring a new trial and affirmed its earlier opinion that the record did 
not show actual prejudice in this case. 1d. at 468, 473·74, 370 P.2d at 475, 477 . 
... 28 U.S.C. app., at 560 note (1976) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules), 
quoted in HAWAII R. EVID. 606 commentary . 
••• Rules 608 and 609 are among the exceptions to the general exclusion of character evi· 
dence, HAWAII R. EVID. 404(a)(3). See text accompanying notes 78·95 supra . 
•• 7 HAWAII R. EVID. 608(a). 
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may not contradict them by calling other witnesses. 148 
In Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd.,149 the Hawaii Supreme Court 
held that the trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination about a false 
affidavit constituted reversible error because the witness could "be cross-
examined as to specific acts affecting her credibility."l00 The Cozine court 
emphasized, however, that "[s]uch cross-examination rests in the discre-
tion of the court, and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion."Ul Rule 
608(b) expressly commits control of this kind of questioning to the court's 
discretion, and the commentary to rule 403 refers specifically to rule 
608(b) as a prime example of the need for a discretionary balance of rele-
vance, prejudicial impact, and jury confusion. False statements under 
oath, the subject matter of impeachment in Cozine, are devastatingly rel-
evant to credibility, but other conduct, collateral in the sense that it bears 
no relation to the substantive issues in the litigated case, invariably calls 
for a critical assessment of relevance to credibility and counterbalancing 
factors. Thus, "[a] witness may not be questioned as to his involvement 
with drugs solely to show he is unreliable or lacks veracity."Ulli The same 
assessment must inform the decision whether to allow impeachment by 
prior criminal conviction under rule 609. 
"For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
he has been convicted of a crime is inadmissible except when the crime is 
one involving dishonesty."uls The use of the words "inadmissible except" 
in rule 609(a) implicitly suggests the discretionary nature of the prior-
conviction impeachment decision. So understood, the rule codifies the re-
sult in Asato v. Furtado,1114 where the Hawaii Supreme Court approved 
the trial court's action disallowing impeachment by prior conviction for 
careless driving because the conviction bore "no rational relation to . 
... See MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 42, at 84 . 
... 49 Hawaii 77, 412 P.2d 669 (1966), discussed in Part VII infra. Plaintiff, a passenger 
on a commercial catamaran chartered by her husband, sought damages for injuries she sus-
tained when the mast broke and struck her on the head. Defendant appealed a jury award 
of $12,750 for plaintiff. In a pretrial affidavit, plaintiff asserted that she had made diligent 
efforts to obtain business records to support the medical costs she claimed. The sworn state-
ment apparently conflicted with a pretrial deposition where plaintiff aumitted she only 
asked one drug store for the information and neglected to request relevant records from her 
physicians. 
'00 Id. at WI, 412 P.2d at 685 . 
••• Id. (footnote omitted) . 
••• State v. Sugimoto, 62 Hawaii _, _, 614 P.2d 386, 390 (1980). Defendant sought to 
cross-examine the prosecution witness, who had been granted immunity to testify in the 
rape and robbery prosecution, regarding the witness' use and possible sale of marijuana. 
••• HAWAII R. EVJD. 609(a). Rule 609(c) permits the impeachment use of juvenile convic-
tions "to the same extent as ... criminal convictions under subsection (a) of this rule." In 
State v. Sugimoto, 62 Hawaii _, -. 614 P.2d 386, 390 (1980), the court held that a deferred 
acceptance of guilty plea is not a conviction and therefore may not be used to impeach a 
witness even if the crime involved is relevant to the issue of the witness' veracity . 
• 84 52 Hawaii 284, 474 P.2d 288 (1970). 
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[the] witness' credibility."11i1i The Asato holding is unexciting, but the 
dicta are powerful: 
[W)e think it unwise to admit evidence of any and all convictions on the issue 
of credibility. We hold that admission of such evidence should be limited to 
those convictions that are relevant to the issue of truth and veracity. A perjury 
conviction, for example, would carry considerable probative value in a determi-
nation of whether a witness is likely to falsify under oath. We also think that 
other crimes that fall into the class of crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statement would have some value in a rational determination of credibility"~6 
On the other hand, the court said that offenses "like murder or assault 
and battery"11i7 should not be admitted: 
It is hard to see any rational connection between, say, a crime of violence and 
the likelihood that the witness will [not) tell the truth. In addition, there is the 
danger that a moralistic jury might decide not to believe a witness who has 
been convicted of a serious crime, even though the crime has no rational con-
nection to credibility. IllS 
Use of the word "dishonesty" in the rule 609 formulation is intended to 
invoke the Asato wisdom. Does the word embrace theft crimes, which 
seem to fall in the middle of the spectrum from murder to perjury? Possi-
bly SO,1Ii9 but a bright-line answer to this type of question is totally at war 
with the essentially discretionary nature of the rule 609 decision, which 
should take into account all aspects of the particular trial setting in which 
the impeachment is proposed. Another factor of obvious significance is 
the age of the prior conviction. ISO The idea of discretion is not simply 
, •• Id. at 295, 474 P.2d at 296. The conviction, based on a jury verdict, involved the same 
traffic accident giving rise to the civil suit for damages in Asato. While the prior conviction 
could not be used to impeach the defendant, the court held that it was admissible evidence 
on the i88ue of defendant's negligence, although not conclusive proof thereof. Id. at 290-92, 
474 P.2d at 293-94. See also Michel v. Valdastri, Ltd., 59 Hawaii 53, 574 P.2d 1299 (1978) 
(error to disallow evidence that defendant violated Occupational Safety and Health Law to 
prove negligence); note 63 sup,.a. 
'06 52 Hawaii at 293, 474 P.2d at 295. 
'07 Id. 
'&I Id. 
, •• See S. STAND. COMM. REP. No. 22-80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Se88. 10 (1980): "For exam-
ple, a conviction for assault would not be available for impeachment but a conviction for 
larceny could be used to impeach." Under a similar formulation contained in federal rule 
609(a)(2), compa,.e United States v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir.), vacated and ,.e-
manded pu,.suant to Memo,.andum 0/ Solicito,. Gene,.al, 439 U.S. 811 (1978) (permissible 
impeachment with petty theft by false representation where appellant had taken gun from 
his employer), with United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1977) (impermis-
sible impeachment with misdemeanor shoplifting conviction for taking two bottles of 
vodka). 
'80 The federal rule imposes an arbitrary, ten-year time limit on prior convictions used to 
impeach, although the court may exercise discretion to admit the evidence so long as the 
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to modify the usual standard of appellate review but rather to invest in 
trial judges an appropriate latitude for multi-factor, contextual 
decisionmaking. 
Rule 609 restates the Hawaii Supreme Court's due process holding in 
State v. Santiago,181 prohibiting impeachment of the accused by prior 
conviction.182 To what extent, it might be asked, does Santiago limit 
cross-exam,ination of the accused with respect to other collateral events 
under rule 608(b)? The answer is supplied by State v. Pokini,I63 where 
the court approved questioning of the defendant concerning his employ-
ment and income sources. The accused, concluded the Pokini court, "may 
be cross-examined on collateral matters bearing upon his credibility, the 
same as any other witness. "184 The matter is discretionary with the trial 
court, "[b Jut there are obvious limitations beyond which the court may 
not allow the examiner to venture. "186 
One such limitation will bar questions about prior criminal conduct of 
the accused for which no conviction was had.188 In the first place, such 
evidence has even less relevance to veracity than have prior convictions, 
which carry their own assurance that the subject events really occurred.167 
Moreover, if Santiago flatly bars use of convictions, then, with even 
stronger force, it would bar other evidence of the same kinds of conduct 
adverse party has written notice of the proponent's intent. FEn. R. EVID. 609(b). The Hawaii 
drafters wisely rejected any time limits, recognizing that the age factor may have varying 
significance depending on the kind of criminal activity presented, as well as other factors in 
the case. 
'" 53 Hawaii 254, 260,492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971). The prosecutor had elicited testimony 
from defendant regarding a prior conviction for burglary in the first degree. This was one of 
four points raised' on appeal and resolved in favor of defendant. The court reversed defen-
dant's conviction for murder of a police officer who was investigating a call of domestic 
trouble when a gun struggle ensued which resulted in the officer's shooting death . 
... Rule 609's impeachment bar does not apply where the accused "has himself intro-
duced testimony for the purpose of establishing his credibility as a witness." The Santiago 
court reserved this question: "While we would hesitate to erect a trap under which an un-
wary defense lawyer's introduction of some trivial evidence concerning the accused's credi-
bility may unleash a flood of damaging prior convictions, we need not reach those matters in 
this case." 53 Hawaii at 261, 492 P.2d at 661. 
••• 57 Hawaii 17, 548 P.2d 1397 (1976). The court reversed defendant's conviction for 
conspiracy to murder because of prejudicial conduct of the court and because a transcript 
containing highly prejudicial details of defendant's involvement in other murders had been 
admitted into evidence, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 
... [d. at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400. Cf. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980) (ille-
gally seized evidence (t-shirt) admiBBible to impeach defendant's trial testimony in response 
to croBB-examination even though it did not contradict direct examination testimony); State 
v. Gomes, 59 Hawaii 572, 584 P.2d 127 (1978) (impeachment use of illegally seized pistol 
permiBBible where defendant testified on direct examination that police found no weapons) . 
... 57 Hawaii at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400 . 
... See note 152 supra and accompanying text. 
••• Indeed, the court will not even allow impeachment use of deferred acceptance of guilty 
pleas, see note 153 supra, which provoke little doubt that the accused committed the crime 
involved. 
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offered for the same purpose of character attack concerning credibility. 
This result is commended in the commentary to rule 608. 
Rule 609.1, which has no federal rule counterpart, governs impeach-
ment by evidence of bias, interest, or motive. The principal purpose of 
this rule is to restate the result in State v. Murphy,188 where the Hawaii 
Supreme Court decided that, as a precondition to allowing extrinsic evi-
dence of a witness' bias, interest, or motive, the impeaching material 
must be brought to the attention of the witness on cross-examination. 
The Murphy court explained: 
First, the foundational cross-examination gives the witness a fair opportunity 
to explain statements or equivocal facts which, standing alone, tend to show 
bias. Second, such cross-examination lends expediency to trials, for if the facts 
showing bias are admitted by the witness, the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence becomes unnecessary. 1'. 
Impeachment and support of witnesses' credibility through evidentiary 
use of their prior statements are the subjects of rule 613. On the impeach-
ment side, several modifications of present practice are effected concern-
ing the foundation that must be established during examination-in-chief 
of a witness as a condition to extrinsic proof of her prior inconsistent 
statements. To begin with, rule 613(b) provides that the foundation is 
required on "direct or cross-examination," in order to achieve consistency 
with the own-witness impeachment allowance of rule 607.170 Regarding 
the nature of the foundation, "(1) the circumstances of the [prior incon-
sistent] statement [must be] brought to the attention of the witness, and 
(2) the witness [must be] asked whether [s]he made the statement."l7l A 
previous statute barred extrinsic evidence where the witness "distinctly" 
admitted having made the inconsistent statement,17I but the reason for 
188.59 Hawaii 1, 575 P.2d 448 (1978). Appellant was convicted of murdering a young wo-
man whose body was found in the laundry room of the Waikiki Gateway Hotel. 'The hotel's 
assistant manager testified that he saw appellant enter the same elevator as the deceased, 
which was the last time the victim was seen alive. Defendant sought to show that the wit-
ness was biased in favor of the prosecution by proving that he had refused to talk about the 
case with an investigator from the public defender's office. Because the defense attorney did 
not cross-examine the assistant manager about the incident with the investigator and be-
cause there were no eiceptional circumstances which would have made foundational ques-
tioning unduly burdensome, the court held that it was not error for the trial court to pre-
clude the defense from calling the investigator to testify on the matter. 
189 [d. at 18, 575 P.2d at 459-60. 
170 See text accompanying notes 136-39 supra. 
171 HAWAII R. EVID. 613(b). See note 225 infra. The foundation requirement, noted the 
court in State v. Pokini, 57 Hawaii 26, 29, 548 P.2d 1402, 1405, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 
(1976), "is for the purpose of rekindling the witness' memory." 
171 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621-23 (1976) (repealed 1980); see State v. Napeahi, 57 Hawaii 
365,368-75,556 P.2d 569, 572-76 (1976) (defendant met the statutory requirements for pro-
ducing extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of prosecution witness but error 
was harmless because evidence of guilt was overwhelming). 
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the bar related to a hearsay concept that also has been modified by the 
new rules. 
Heretofore, all prior inconsistent witness statements were hearsay, usa-
ble only for impeachment purposes with an instruction so limiting jury 
consideration of them. Thus, when the witness admitted making the 
statement she was effectively impeached; no further purpose justified re-
ceiving extrinsic evidence of the statement. Indeed, admitting extrinsic 
evidence would have risked jury use of the statement for substantive pur-
poses in violation of the limiting instruction. Rule 802.1(1), however, now 
excepts from the hearsay ban most written or recorded prior inconsistent 
statements that are offered to impeach under rule 613 and allows their 
use to prove the truth of their contents.178 Therefore, impeaching parties 
should not be precluded from proving these statements even when wit-
nesses admit having made them. They are substantively admissible, if rel-
evant, and should be received, subject to the court's general discretionary 
control under rule 403.174 Rule 613(b) thus requires only that the witness 
be confronted with the circumstances and the contents of the prior 
statement. 1711 
Rule 613(c) provides for limited admissibility of prior consistent wit-
ness statements to support credibility, and hearsay rule 802.1(2) effects a 
corresponding hearsay exception.l7t' Consistent statements are usable for 
support only in three circumstances: (1) where they antedate inconsistent 
statements that have been elicited under subsection (b); (2) where they 
rebut an assertion that the witness' testimony was recently fabricated or 
influenced by bias; and (3) where they rebut an imputation to the witness 
of inaccurate memory. The first ground was taken from the California 
Evidence Code;177 the second, from the federal rules;178 and the third, 
from a recent Hawaii Supreme Court decision.17' 
Rule 611(a) admonishes the trial court to "exercise reasonable control 
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evi-
.. I See the discussion of rule 802.1(1) in text accompanying notes 210-15 infra. 
"4 Courts have always exercised discretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of prior inconsis-
tent statements that relate only to collateral matters, see MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 
47, and this discretion is preserved in rule 613(b). In addition, since prior inconsistent state-
ments not reduced to writing are not excepted from the hearsay exclusion by rule 802.1(1), 
courts very well may decide to bar extrinsic evidence in this category when the witness 
admits having made the statement and is thus effectively impeached. 
'7' The final legislative report, CONP. COMM. REP. No. SO-SO, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. 9 
(19SO) (discussing rule 613(b», notes that, although the cross-examiner is not bound to af-
ford the witness an opportunity to explain the impeaching statement, "the opposing counsel 
[who would ordinarily be the proponent of the witness] may very well ask the witness to 
explain." Deference to triaI strategy explains the elimination of the requirement to allow the 
impeached witness to explain or deny the statement. [d. 
"8 See text accompanying note 216 infra. 
'77 CAL. Evm. CODE § 791(a) (West 1966). 
'78 FED. R. Evm. SOl(d)(l)(B) . 
.. I State v. Altergott, 57 Hawaii 492, 504-05, 559 P.2d 728, 736-37 (1977). 
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dence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for 
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, 
and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. "180 
Rule 611(b) limits the scope of cross-examination to "the subject matter 
of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the wit-
ness,"18l and rule 611(c) interdicts the use of leading questions on "the 
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his 
testimony.ttl8S Rule 612 governs the refreshing of witnesses' memories.18S 
These rules faithfully track their federal rule counterparts and work no 
change in existing law. 11K 
VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Article VII contains seven rules designed to rationalize and liberalize 
the practice of receiving opinion evidence. Rule 701 concerns lay witness 
opinions and admits them when "(1) rationally based on the perception 
of the witness, and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony 
or the determination of a fact in issue.ttl811 The remainder treat the sub-
ject of expert witness testimony. 
The previous practice concerning expert opinion evidence is aptly illus-
trated by the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in Cozine v. Hawaiian 
Catamaran, Ltd.,18e a negligence action where the plaintiff had been in-
jured when the mast of a catamaran, owned and operated by the defen-
dant, broke and fell on her. At the trial expert testimony was addressed 
to the cause of the mast failure and the nature and extent of the plain-
tiff's injuries. The trial court precluded one expert, a marine engineer and 
naval architect, from giving his opinion that mast failures of the sort then 
being litigated commonly occurred in the absence of negligence and that 
the mast probably failed because of latent defects. 
180 In like vein, rule 614 enables the court to call and to interrogate witnesses itself. Cf. 
State v. Schutter, 60 Hawaii 221, 588 P.2d 428 (1978) (trial court's extensive cross-examina-
tion of defense witnesses was improper). 
181 Rule 611(b) also enables the court, "in the exercise of discretion, [to) permit inquiry 
into additional matters as if on direct examination." 
,.2 Rule 611(c) also permits leading questions "[w)hen a party calls a hostile witness, an 
adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party." See text accompanying notes 
136-39 supra. 
I •• See State v. Altergott, 57 Hawaii 492, 502-04, 559 P.2d 728, 735-36 (1977). 
,.4 For example, rule 615 states the familiar witness exclusion rule, designed to prevent 
fabrication of testimony, see, e.g .• Harkins v. Ikeda, 57 Hawaii 378. 382-84. 557 P.2d 788, 
792 (1976). 
,.& Previous law was roughly to the same effect. compare State v. Sartain, No. 7104 (Ha-
waii Sup. Ct. Oct. 24. 1980) (no enor for trial court to exclude defendant's opinion that 
amount of heroin normally contained in a $100 paper would be twice the amount defendant 
was charged with selling). with Tsuruoka v. Lukens, 32 Hawaii 263. 264-65 (1932) (father's 
opinion of child's physical condition following accident admissible). 
188 49 Hawaii 77. 412 P.2d 669 (1966). 
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The appellate court sustained exclusion of the opinion on the grounds 
that it was not necessary, that it invaded the province of the jury, and 
that in any event it was addressed to an ultimate question. 
It is a sound principle that expert opinions should not be extended beyond the 
point of necessity, and that encroachment upon the province of the jury should 
be avoided if possible. . . . [T]he test of the admissibility of expert evidence is 
whether the jurors are incompetent to draw their own conclusions from the 
facts without the aid of such evidence. . . . It was for the jury to determine 
whether the accident was one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
negligence. The balance of probability rested with the jury, and there was no 
necessity of eliciting an expert opinion on this ultimate question.1' 7 
This grudging approach to the forensic use of experts typifies the attitude 
of the common-law courts. 
The medical expert in Cozine had examined the plaintiff before trial in 
order to testify about her physical condition. He was asked a "very long" 
hypothetical questionl88 based upon the evidence theretofore presented, 
and he gave his opinion. On cross-examination, however, the physician 
admitted that he based his opinion not only on the material in the hypo-
thetical question but also on things the ,plaintiff previously told him. IS. In 
addition, it appeared that he based his opinion to some extent on reports 
he had received from other physicians, but the other physicians had not 
been called to testify. For these reasons the court held that the failure of 
the trial court to grant the motion to strike the testimony of the witness 
consituted reversible error. leo Why error? 
A nontreating medical expert cannot base his opinion on the plaintiff's out-of-
court statements as to her past condition, not shown to be the same as the 
evidence of record. Nor can a medical expert opinion be based on the reports 
of other doctors, which are not of record and contain matters of opinion. The 
testimony in question was in violation of these rules. 181 
Simply stated, the court's point was that the basis for the opinion was 
partly hearsay, and, in any event, was not fully presented in the hypo-
187 [d. at 92-93, 412 P.2d at 681. 
'88 [d. at 105,412 P.2d at 687. The question 'occupied nearly five pages of trial transcript. 
, •• [d. at 105-06, 412 P.2d at 687. 
'110 [d. at 110,412 P.2d at 690. In Barretto v. Aksu, 51 Hawaii 383, 391, 463 P.2d 917, 922 
(1969), the court reversed and remanded the case where the trial court had refused to allow 
cross-examination use of a hypothetical question based on facts not yet in evidence. The 
court noted that the expert's response should be stricken if the facts relied upon were not 
later proved by the party posing the hypothetical question. 
181 49 Hawaii at 106, 412 P.2d at 687 (footnote omitted). C{. State v. Davis, 53 Hawaii 
582, 589-90, 499, P.2d 663, 669 (1972) (expert property appraiser improperly testified about 
severance damages based on anonymous engineer's hearsay opinion about a matter that ap-
praiser was not qualified to evaluate as an expert). 
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thetical question. 
The principal purpose of the requirement of a hypothetical question 
was to ensure that the expert's opinion, to the extent not based upon . 
personal knowledge, would be based entirely upon evidence of record.1911 
In short, the rules of evidence were rigorously applied to the basis of ex-
pert testimony, even though the experts might have their own rules about 
the reliability of various kinds of data upon which to base scientific judg-
ments. This approach steadfastly ignored the ability of cross-examiners to 
sift, and jurors to evaluate, opinions based on hearsay; experts either ap-
preciated the hearsay rule in their practice or would not be heard in 
court. 
Article VII modifies almost every aspect of Cozine. Rule 702 addresses 
the question what is a proper subject matter for expert testimony and 
scuttles the former "necessity" approach. Expert testimony can be re-
ceived "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue."193 The commentary points out that although rule 702 sets "a broad 
standard with respect to the scope of expert testimony," the shift is "in 
degree only" because of the requirement of assistance to the trier of fact. 
Rule 703 jettisons the former "basis" limitation: "If of a type reasona-
bly relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data [underlying the opinion] 
need not be admissible in evidence." Federal rule 703, which is to the 
same effect, "is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions. . . and 
to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts 
themselves when not in COurt."IH Under either rule the testimony of the 
medical expert in Cozine would be received, because physicians com-
monly rely upon information provided by the patient and reports from 
other professionals.I • 1I The manner in which the basis is to be presented 
, .. McCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 15. 
," HAWAD R. Evm. 702. The qualifications of experts are discretionary with the court, but 
rule 702 suggests that "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify ... in the form of an opinion or otherwise." See, e.g., 
State v. Lloyd, 61 Hawaii 50S, 606 P.2d 913 (1980) (police officers may qualify as experts by 
reason of experience or specialized training). 
, .. 28 U.S.C. app., at 571 note (1976). 
, •• Hawaii rule 703 contains two safeguards against receipt of utterly untrustworthy opin-
ions. Recognizing the general permissiveness of rules 702 and 703, the Hawaii drafters added 
the following sentence to rule 703, not contained in the federal counterpart: "The court 
may, however, disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying 
facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness." HAWAD R. Evm. 703. This seems a desirable 
counterbalance. Moreover, to the same effect is the rule 703 requirement of reasonable reli-
ance by other experts in the same field: "[A] court would not be justified in 'admitting in 
evidence the opinion of an "accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automobile 
collision based on statements of bystandeni, since this requirement is not satisfied.''' [d. 
commentary (quoting 28 U.S.C. app., at 571 note (1976». Accord, State v. Antone, 62 Ha-
waii -. 615 P.2d 101 (1980); State v. Chang, 46 Hawaii 22, 374 P.2d 5 (1962) (results of 
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to the trier of fact is the subject of rule 705. 
Consistent with rule 703, rule 705 torpedoes the requirement of a hypo-
thetical question: 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons 
therefor without disclosing the underlying facts or data if the underlying facts 
or data have been disclosed in discovery proceedings. The expert may in any 
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination. 
This rule implicitly entrusts evaluation of expert opinions to adversary 
treatment, which seems preferable to the former practice for several rea-
sons. To begin with, cumbersome hypothetical questions hardly afforded 
a meaningful foundation for jury judgment. 1" In most instances the ques-
tions were lengthy, technical, and confusing. In any event, the new rule 
does not foreclose the use of hypotheticals on direct or cross-examination. 
So long as discovery has been available,187 however, there is simply no 
need to require disclosure of the basis on direct. Most proponents, of 
course, can be expected to elicit the basis, either directly or hypotheti-
cally, in order to enhance the force and persuasiveness of the opinion. 1" 
If the underlying data are not otherwise admissible in evidence, limiting 
instructions under rule 105 will be in order. 1" If the basis is not fully 
specified on direct examination, the cross-examiner is free to explore all 
relevant factors. Rule 702.1 makes clear that an expert witness may be 
fully cross-examined as to "(1) his qualifications, (2) the subject to which 
his expert testimony relates, and (3) the matter upon which his opinion is 
based and the reasons for his opinion. "lIOO 
polygraph or lie detector test are inadmissible whether offered by the prosecution or the 
defense). 
'M The hypothetical question requirement was criticized by the court in Barretto v. Abu, 
51 Hawaii 383, 388-89, 463 P.2d 917, 921 (1969), discussed in note 190 supra. 
'0"7 The federal rule allows the proponent to dispense with disclosure of the basis "unless 
the court requires otherwise," F'BD. R. Evm. 705, because, as the commentary suggests, dis-
closure is available in discovery proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. app., at 572 note (1976). The 
Hawaii drafters recognized that pretrial discovery of the basis may not always be available. 
Experts may be engaged on the eve of trial, or may not be available for deposition. Experts 
may not submit written reports in advance of trial. Accordingly, Hawaii rule 705 dispenses 
with the testimonial disclosure requirement "if the underlying facts or data have been dis-
closed in discovery proceedings." This affords the opponent the same advantage in prepar-
ing cross-examination presently enjoyed. 
, •• See, e.g., Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., No. 6190, slip op. at 17-19 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 8, 1980). C{. State v. Dillingham Corp., 60 Hawaii 393, 591 P.2d 1049 (1979) (founda-
tion requirements to show similarity of property sales are relaxed where evidence is used to 
support appraiser's opinion in condemnation action rather than as evidence of comparable 
sales offered to prove the fair market value of the condemned property). 
'" See the discussion of rule 105 in Part I supra. 
200 Rule 702.1, which has no federal rule counterpart, also permits impeachment of an 
expert by use of scientific texts and treatises whenever a treatise was relied upon by the 
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Rule 704 establishes that opinion testimony "otherwise admissible is 
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact." The reason usually given for excluding "ultimate" opin-
ions was that they invaded or usurped the jury's function, and this was 
part of the rationale in Cozine.101 In one limited sense, however, the ulti-
mate issue bar had merit. Witnesses should not be permitted to opine 
about a defendant's negligence, not because the concept is ultimate but 
rather because it embraces a legal standard. The question of negligence is 
for the jury under proper instructions that supply the legal meaning of 
the term. Accordingly, use of the term by a witness should be prohibited 
because it risks jury confusion of the witness' subjective notion of the 
concept with the legal meaning supplied by the COurt.202 The question in 
Cozine whether mast failures occur without negligence is therefore objec-
tionable, not because ultimate, but because the answer will not "assist the 
trier of fact" under rule 702. Moreover, the witness is not qualified to 
interpret a legal construct. It is believed that courts have in many cases 
reached proper results by applying the "ultimate issue" test,lOS but the 
problem always lay in deciding what "ultimate" meant, guided only by 
the meaningless "invasion" or "usurpation" slogan.104 The key to rule 704 
is that ultimate testimony is no longer objectionable so long as "otherwise 
admissible." The commentary to the rule quotes from the federal rule 
commentary: 
Thus the question, "Did T have the [sic] capacity to make a will?" would be 
excluded, while the question, "Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know 
the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and 
to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?" would be allowed"·· 
The Cozine question should have been formulated to inquire whether 
mast failures can occur even when catamaran operators exercise the de-
expert or when it "qualifies for admission into evidence under rule 803(b)(18)." HAWAII R. 
EVID. 702.l(b)(2). See the discussion of substantive admissibility of treatise material in text 
accompanying notes 238-42 infra. 
1.1 See text accompanying note 187 supra . 
... See generally Kom, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. lOBO 
(1966). 
I.a Exclusion of that part of the Cozine opinion employing the term "negligence" is an 
example; however, the expert's opinion that the mast failure was due to latent defects would 
seem to be admissible under article VII. 
"" In Bright v. Quinn, 20 Hawaii 504, 507 (1911), a witness was asked, "What would you 
consider to be a safe distance to run from the bough of that tree?" and, "What is the proper 
distance or space to allow your machine in passing under a tree ... ?" Disallowance of the 
questions was sustained because they "in eifect called for the opinion of the witness upon 
the ultimate issue of negligence," id. This is exactly the kind of result that is overruled by 
rule 704, because this is precisely the kind of information the trier of fact needs to decide 
the negligence question. 
I., HAWAII R. Evm. 704 commentary (quoting 28 U.S.C. app., at 571 note (1976)). 
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gree of care customarily required in their calling. 
VIII. HEARSAY AND THE EXCEPTIONS 
Article VIII reorganizes but does not significantly vary the federal hear-
say provisions. Rule 801 supplies definitions, and rule 802 states the gen-
eral exclusion: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these 
rules, or any other rules prescribed by the Hawaii supreme court, or by 
statute."I06 Rules 802.1, 803, and 804 provide no fewer than thirty-eight 
exceptions to the rule! What kind of rule, the reader may be tempted to 
ask, is it that requires thirty-eight exceptions? Why did not the Hawaii 
rules innovate and bring simplicity to this opaque area of the law? Part of 
the answer is that the federal rules presented a formidable obstacle to 
hearsay law reform. Moreover, lawyers, it seems, always have been 
charmed by the mysteries and intricacies of hearsay doctrine. It is there-
fore perhaps appropriate to retain this vestige of mystique and 
legerdemain.IO'1 
The stuff of hearsay is out-of-court statements, which include "oral or 
written assertion[s], or ... nonverbal conduct of a person, it is is in-
tended by him as an assertion.'''oa "Hearsay," according to rule 801(3), "is 
a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted. "109 This circumlocution is necessary to make clear that prior state-
ments of even the witnesses are encompassed in the exclusion. Since the 
principal policy of the rule, however, is to interdict receipt of untrustwor-
thy utterances that are not subject to cross-examination, and since wit-
nesses are typically available for cross-examination, rule 802.1 excepts a 
number of prior statements made by witnesses from the ban. 
Rule 802.1 is closely related to rule 613, which governs the use of prior 
witness statements for the limited purposes of impeachment and sup-
port.110 The issue in article VIII is whether the statements can be used 
substantively, that is, to prove the truth of the matters asserted in them. 
It will be recalled that rule 613(b) permits a witness to be confronted and 
.oo See State v. Bannister, 60 Hawaii 658, 594 P.2d 1078 (1979) (reversing theft conviction 
where only evidence of amount and value of stolen apparel was based on store manager's 
hearsay testimony that invoice, which was not in evidence and was not prepared by man-
ager, indicated 53 shorts were missing) . 
.... But cf. Note, The Theoretical Foundation of Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1786 
(1980) (advocating abolition of hearsay ban) . 
• oa HAWAII R. Evm. 801(1). The issue of nonverbal conduct is treated in the commentary 
to this rule. See text accompanying note 217 infra . 
.... See State v. Sugimoto, 62 Hawaii _, -. 614 P.2d 386, 390 (1980) (not error to admit 
police officer's testimony that defendant's aunt told him she lied because testimony was 
offered to explain officer's delay in arresting defendant, not for the truth of the statement). 
The "declarant," according to rule 801(2), is the "person who makes a statement." 
II°See text accompanying notes 174-79 supra. 
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impeached with any prior inconsistent statement made by her, subject to 
proper foundational questioning. III Rule 802.1(1) selects three classes of 
such statements "offered in compliance with rule 613(b)" and exempts 
them from the hearsay ban so long as the witness-declarant "is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the subject matter of ... [her] statement." 
The first class includes statements made while under oath "at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition;"m the second includes 
written statements "signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the de-
clarant;"lI18 and the third includes "substantially verbatim" and contem-
poraneous recordings of oral statements made by the declarant. m The 
elements common to these three classes are that the statements are writ-
ten or recorded, that the writings or recordings were reasonably contem-
poraneous with the actual utterances, and that the writings or recordings 
closely embody the precise language of the utterances.2UI Ruled out by 
these formulations are oral statements not recorded contemporaneously 
or in substantially verbatim form. Such statements, although usable for 
impeachment under rule 613(b), will require limiting instructions. 
Rule 802.1(2) exempts all prior consistent statements by witnesses "of-
fered in compliance with rule 613(c)" from the hearsay exclusion. Rule 
613(c) restricts the circumstances in which prior consistent statements 
can be offered,1Il8 and rule 802.1(2) simply obviates the need for limiting 
instructions in those instances. Rule 802.1(3) admits a witness' prior iden-
tification "of a person made after perceiving him." Prior identifications, 
even when nonverbal, would constitute "statements" for hearsay purposes 
because the conduct is essentially assertive in nature.m Rule 802.1(4) ad-
"" See text accompanying notes 171-75 supra. 
'" HAWAD R. EVID. 802.1(1)(A) . 
... Id. 802.1(1)(B) . 
• ,. Id. 802.1(1)(C) . 
• ,. Federal rule 801(d)(1)(A) admits substantively only those prior statements given 
under oath, and Hawaii rule 802.1(1)(A) is taken almost verbatim from the federal rule. The 
United States Supreme Court had proposed that all prior inconsistent statements used to 
impeach be allowed substantively. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 56 F.R.D. 293 (1972). Part of the rea-
son for the congressional limitation was that in the case of sworn statements, as compared 
with prior oral statements, "there can be no dispute as to whether the prior statement was 
made." H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 7075, 7087. The Hawaii drafters felt that this rationale applies equally to 
the prior written or recorded statements defined in paragraphs (I)(B) and (l)(C) of the 
Hawaii rule. These definitions, as the commentary to rule 802.1 points out, were taken from 
the so-called Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1)-(2) (1976); see Palermo V. United States, 
360 U.S. 343, 349-52 (1959); Williams V. United States, 338 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1964). More-
over, the (1)(B) and (l)(C) formulations resemble the definitions of "statement" contained 
in rules relating to discovery of trial preparation materials, HAWAD R. CIY. P. 26(b)(3)(A)-
(B). Admission of this material against accused in criminal cases will not violate constitu-
tional confrontation standards, see Nelson V. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California V. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
118 See text accompanying notes 176-79 supra . 
... See HAWAD R. EVID. 801(1) commentary. 
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mits memoranda of "past recollection recorded"1I18 if the recordation was 
substantially contemporaneous with the making of the statement and the 
witness "now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully 
and accurately." This is the only 802.1 exception not requiring that the 
witness be "subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of 
his [prior] statement." The compensating factor in exception (4) is that 
the statement must be shown "to reflect . . . correctly" knowledge that 
the witness once had but has since forgotten. Ordinarily the witness him-
self will testify that, although present recollection is dim, he remembers 
making the statement and remembers that it was accurate when made. 
Substantive use of prior witness statements implements the policy of ad-
mitting trustworthy material because, having been made earlier in time, 
the statements present fewer memory and motivation problems than does 
trial testimony generally. 
Rule 803 collects all those exceptions to the hearsay rule for which the 
"availability of declarant [is] immaterial." In other words, these excep-
tions do not depend upon any showing concerning the present status or 
whereabouts of the declarant. The declarant may be unavailable, availa-
ble and subject to subpoena, or even present in the courtroom. The hear-
say is nonetheless received, subject always to relevance and other article 
IV requirements. Rule 803(a) treats admissions, and rule 803(b) treats 
other exceptions in the availability-immaterial class. The reason for this 
breakdown is that the rationales for these two groups of exceptions differ 
markedly enough to justify, if not compel, differing approaches when 
courts apply the rules to individual fact situations. 
Admissions are nothing more than prior statements of parties or their 
agents, servants, or predecessors now offered against them.lUs Confusion 
about this exception is probably attributable to the title word, "admis-
sions." Lawyers and courts sometimes refer to these statements as "ad-
missions against interest," thereby incorrectly suggesting a requirement 
that they were against interest when made. The Hawaii Supreme Court 
.,. The formulation is identical with that contained in federal rule 803(5) . 
... See Christensen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Hawaii 80, 82-84, 470 P.2d 521, 
523-24 (1970). In criminal cases, admissions of accused are typically denominated "confes-
sions," but the rationale, specified below in text, is the same. The evidence rules do not 
attempt to codify restrictions on the use of custodial admissions by accused, see, e.g., Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v. Sugimoto, 62 Hawaii _, _, 614 P.2d 386, 390-
91 (1980) (no error to admit defendant's prior statement to police detective where defen-
dant, who was not then a suspect, voluntarily responded to official request that he go to 
police station because Miranda warnings were not required to be given); State v. Santiago, 
53 Hawaii 254, 261-67, 492 P.2d 657, 662-65 (1971) (state constitution precludes use of de-
fendant's statements made before Miranda warnings either in prosecution's case-in-chief or 
for impeachment purposes). Ct. State v. Alberti, 61 Hawaii 502, 605 P.2d 937 (1980) (where 
withdrawal of guilty plea was pending in federal court, admissions made to support plea are 
admissible in subsequent sta~ prosecution for related offense arising out of the same con-
duct but would not be admissible after federal court approved withdrawal). See also cases 
cited in note 164 supra. 
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recently addressed this problem and pointed out that "[t]he expression, 
'admissions against interest,' is a misnomer."22o An admission need not 
have been against declarant's interest when made, recognized the court; 
the only requirements of this exception are that the statement be rele-
vant and that it now be offered against the party who made it or is con-
sidered responsible for its having been made. The rationale is found in 
the very nature of the adversary system. Regardless of the apparent trust-
worthiness or lack of trustworthiness of admissions,221 it seems essentially 
fair to allow the use against a party of his previous statements relevant to 
the subject matter of the current litigation. For this reason the commen-
tary to rule 803(a) approves "generous treatment of this avenue to 
admissibility. "111 
The classic formulation of an admission, "[a] statement that is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement ... or (B) a statement of 
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth," is contained 
in rule 803(a)(1). One class of adoptive admissions is somewhat problem-
atical: When will mere silence be taken as the equivalent of adoption of a 
statement made by someone else? There cannot be any bright-line rule 
on this matter because, as the commentary points out, "[t]he decision in 
each case calls for an evaluation in terms of probable human behavior."118 
The question of adoption is a preliminary determination for the court 
under rule 104(a),I~ and the decision depends upon whether the nature 
of the statement, in the light of attending circumstances, was such that 
the person who remained silent would have been expected naturally to 
challenge it were it untrue or inaccurate.11II 
Rule 803(a)(2), entitled "Vicarious admissions," is concerned with 
statements made by agents, servants, or co-conspirators of parties. lIS The 
statement of an agent or servant not specifically authorized to speak for 
the party is receivable only if it concerns "a matter within the scope of 
his agency or employment, [and was] made during the existence of the 
••• Kekua v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 61 Hawaii 208, 216 n.3, 601 P.2d 364, 370 n.3 
(1979). 
'01 The Kekua court recognized that the requirement of personal knowledge (rule 602), 
applicable to witnesses and hearsay declarants generally, is relaxed in the case of admis-
sions.Id . 
... HAWAD R. EVID. 803 commentary (quoting 28 U.S.C. app., at 576 note (1976) (Notes of 
Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules» . 
... Id., quoted in HAWAD R. EVID. 803(a)(1) commentary . 
••• See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra . 
••• Silence by an accused in custody cannot be deemed the equivalent of adoption of ac-
cusations or questions because of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610 (1976). Cf. Anderson v. Charles, 100 S. Ct. 2180 (1980) (silence insofar as it 
omits facts included in defendant's subsequent version is admissible for impeachment pur-
poses as prior inconsistent statement); Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980) (fifth 
amendment and due process not violated by impeachment use of prearrest silence) . 
••• This rule closely resembles its federal counterpart, FED. R. EVlD. 801(d)(2)(C}-(E). 
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relationship."117 Paragraphs (a)(3), (4), and (5) treat admissions by dece-
dents in wrongful death actions, by predecessors in interest, and by pred-
ecessors in litigation.1IS 
The rule 803(b) exceptions are grounded in considerations of inherent 
trustworthiness. The general hearsay exclusion of rule 802 expresses a 
preference for live testimony given under oath at trial, which is a princi-
pal characteristic of the American justice system. This preference, how-
ever, is overlooked in the 803(b) exceptions because their reliability is 
considered roughly equivalent to that of live testimony. It is for this rea-
son that the current availability of the declarant is not germane to admis-
sibility in any of these exceptions. Different exceptions have distinct ra-
tionales or policies that courts should keep in mind when deciding 
preliminary admissibility questions. In most instances the rationale is 
specified in the commentary. The most litigated of the rule 803(b) excep-
tions are excited utterances,lIe statements of physical or mental condi-
tion,BSo statements made to physicians,lu business records,1S1 and public 
records. ISS Each of them has extensive common-law support; hence, dis-
cussion here will focus on variations from standard common-law doctrine. 
The common law sustained admission of statements to physicians only 
when made in the context of medical treatment, and the policy was that 
declarants seeking or receiving treatment would not likely misstate rele-
vant facts. Rule 803(b)(4), however, admits statements made during 
"medical diagnosis or treatment," thus specifically qualifying statements 
made to physicians employed only for purposes of the litigation. The old 
rationale does not justify the expansion, but the commentary points out 
that these statements will be recited by physicians in any event under 
rules 703 and 705;184 thus, the only real impact of the change is to obviate 
the need for a limiting instruction which would be of dubious efficacy. 
The former business records or "shop book" rule is expanded to include 
records of any "regularly conducted activity," but in other respects does 
not differ from the previous statute.IU Because "business" was always de-
fined broadly to include noncommercial occupations and callings, as well 
as nonprofit institutions, the variation is not a substantial one . 
• n HAWAII R. EVID. 803(a)(2). Accord, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) . 
••• These paragraphs, which have no federal counterparts, resemble California rules, see 
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1227, 1225, 1224 (West 1966) . 
••• HAWAII R. EVID. 803(b)(2); see Anduha v. County of Maui, 30 Hawaii 44, 50-51 (1927). 
See generally State v. Antone, 62 Hawaii _, _ & n.10, 615 P.2d 101, 107·08 & n.10 (1980) 
(victim's statements made 1 V2 to 2 hours after rape arguably were excited utterances) . 
... HAWAII R. EVID. 803(b)(3) . 
... [d. 803(b)(4) . 
... [d. 803(b)(6)·(7) . 
... [d. 803(b)(8)·(10) . 
... [d. 803(b)(4) commentary. See text accompanying notes 194·99 supra . 
... Compare HAWAII R. EVID. 803(b)(6), with HAWAII REV. STAT. § 622·5 (1976) (repealed 
1980). See State v. Torres, 60 Hawaii 271, 276·77, 589 P.2d 83, 86-87 (1978); Warshaw v. 
Rockresorts, Inc., 57 Hawaii 645, 562 P.2d 428 (1977). 
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The public records exception, identical with its federal counterpart, is 
expanded to include "factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of infor-
mation or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness," or unless 
the evidence is to be used against a criminal defendant.2S8 Dean McCor-
mick argued for receipt of this material: "[T]he conclusions of a profes-
sional investigator making inquiries required by his professional and pub-
lic duty contain assurances of reliability analogous to those relied upon as 
assuring accuracy of his statements of fact from firsthand knowledge."IIS7 
Learned treatises and texts are admitted to prove the truth of their 
contents "[t]o the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination,"I133 pro-
vided the material is established as a reliable authority.IISB Previous prac-
tice admitted statements in reliable texts only for impeachment pur-
poses,1I40 but the limiting instruction was of questionable validity. Rule 
702.1 permits impeachment by treatises that qualify substantively under 
this rule.1I41 Limiting the substantive use of texts to occasions where ex-
perts are testifying and thus able to explain them is consistent with the 
federal rule on the subject. UI 
Rule 804(b) contains six hearsay exceptionsll4s that are expressly depen-
dent upon a showing that the declarant is "unavailable as a witness" as 
that phrase is comprehensively defined in rule 804(a). The theory is that 
the preference for live testimony should not yield to statements of this 
class, whose reliability, although substantially greater than that of hear-
... HAWAII R. EVID. 803(b)(8). The exclusion in criminal cases results from "the almost 
certain collision with confrontation rights which would result from ... use [of this material] 
against the accused in a criminal case," 28 U.S.C. app., at 584 note (1976) (Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on Proposed Rules). The accused's confrontation rights are discussed in 
text accompanying notes 245-56 infra . 
•• 7 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 317, at 738. The commentary to this rule suggests 
that, in evaluating trustworthiness, the court consider "(I) the timeliness of the investiga-
tion. . . (2) the special skill or experience of the official. . . (3) whether a hearing was held 
and the level at which conducted ... (4) possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer 
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 ... (1943). Others no doubt could be added." 28 U.S.C. app., at 
584 note (1976) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules) (citations omitted), 
quoted in S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 7051, 7064-65; HAWAII R. Evm. 803(b)(8)(C) commentary. The rule admits official 
investigative findings, see Hodge V. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1977), but not 
statements of witnesses even when appended to an official report, John McShain, Inc. V. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977) . 
... HAWAII R. EVID. 803(b)(18) . 
••• Reliability, according to rule 803(b)(18), can be established "by the testimony or ad-
mission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice." 
... See Fraga V. Hoffschlaeger Co., 26 Hawaii 557, 566-67 (1922), aff'd, 290 F. 146 (9th 
Cir. 1923) . 
.. , See note 200 supra . 
... FED. R. Evm. 803(18). The treatises may not, however, be received as exhibits . 
... See text accompanying notes 261-67 infra. 
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say generally, is thought to be inferior to that of the 803(b) exceptions. 
Unavailability of a declarant can be found in five circumstances: claim of 
privilege, refusal to testify despite court order to do so, lack of memory, 
death or illness, and absence from the trial or hearing where "the propo-
nent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by pro-
cess or other reasonable means."··· This last ground requires amplifica-
tion. To begin with, it fails to distinguish between civil and criminal 
cases, and such a distinction is necessitated by the confrontation clause of 
the Federal and State Constitutions. 
In State v. Kim,·41 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the civil un-
availability standard, requiring merely that the declarant of former testi-
mony be shown to be absent from the jurisdiction,··e would not suffice in 
criminal cases because of the confrontation clause··7 as it has been con-
strued by the Supreme COurt.14. The purpose of the clause is to preserve 
the right of accused to be confronted by their accusers and to be able to 
cross-examine the witnesses against them. 
The declarant in Kim was out of the State, but the court held that 
"unavailability" in criminal cases requires additionally that the prosecu-
tor demonstrate "a good, faith effort to ascertain the actual location of the 
witness, and thereafter,' if necessary, [make an] ... attempt to compel 
the witness's [sic] attendance at trial through use of the Uniform Act to 
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Proceedings."··8 Kim involved former testimony/liGO but there is reason to 
suppose that the strict criminal unavailability requirement will apply 
equally to the other five exceptions in rule 804(b) because former testi-
mony is more inherently reliable than any of them, and reliability is an 
••• HAWAII R. EVID. 804(a)(5). Rule 804(a) also specifies that the declarant "is not unavail-
able as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is 
due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from attending or testifying." 
... 55 Hawaii 346, 519 P.2d 1241 (1974) . 
••• See Levy v. Kimball, 51 Hawaii 540, 542-43, 465 P.2d 580, 582 (1970) (declarant in 
New York) . 
... U.S. CONST. amend. VI; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 14 . 
••• 55 Hawaii at 349-50, 519 P.2d at 1244 (discussing Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 
(1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968». Cf, Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539, 
2543-45 (1980) (constitutional requirement of unavailability met where prosecution issued 
five subpoenas to last known real address of declarant and talked with declarant's mother 
who testified at trial that she had made unsuccessful efforts to find her daughter) . 
••• 55 Hawaii at 350, 519 P.2d at 1244. The Uniform Act referred to by the Kim court is 
HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 836 (1976), as amended by Act 307, 1980 Hawaii Sess. Laws 962 . 
••• The court reversed appellant's conviction for negligent homicide where the prosecutor 
proved defendant had driven her automobile in a grossly negligent manner by relying on 
pretrial hearing testimony of Dr. Wally to the effect that the injured defendant was drunk 
at the hospital where she was treated after the accident. Although the State knew the doc-
tor's forwarding address in Missouri, apparently no attempt was made to assure his attend-
ance at trial, even though Missouri had adopted the uniform law. 
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important factor in confrontation analysis. SIll 
Although confrontation clause problems can arise in a variety of hear-
say contexts,IU the Hawaii rules, following the lead of the federal rules, 
avoid generally codification of civil and criminal differences arguably jus-
tified by this constitutional criterion. There are two reasons for this. The 
Supreme Court has been less than consis~nt in its confrontation clause 
decisions, several of which are exceedingly difficult to reconcile.211S Consti-
tutional requirements are thus difficult to ascertain, and remain in a de-
velopmental posture.IM Moreover, development to date suggests strongly 
that confrontation issues need to be decided with reference to the entire 
case against the accused. nil Secondly, the federal rules were approved, 
adopted, and transmitted to Congress in 1972 by the very Supreme Court 
that decides confrontation issues. Justice William O. Douglas dissented to 
the transmission of the rules because of his reluctance to place the 
Court's "imprimatur" on them,SH but he was alone. The rules, as finally 
approved and promulgated, were in virtually all instances of amendment 
tightened, not liberalized, by Congress. Therefore, there is good reason to 
suppose that application of the rules in criminal cases will not offend the 
Constitution. Moreover, the Hawaii drafters were not insensitive to possi-
ble confrontation problems and drafted Hawaii's article VIII with an eye 
toward the federal rules, the Supreme Court's 1972 proposals, and appli-
cable case law. 
In civil cases, on the other hand, proponents will need to show only 
that rule 804 declarants are out of the State.lIlI7 Suppose the declarant is 
on one island and the trial is on another. A rule of civil procedure,ZII8 
... Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980); Dutton v. Evan8, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) . 
••• Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (8tatement against interest); Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (codefendant'8 admission); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) 
(former testimony); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (prior statement of witness). 
Admitting substantively prior statements by witnesses that are available for cross-examina-
tion does not offend the clause, see Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
I •• Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980) (former testimony), and Parker v. 
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (co-conspirator's admission), with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 
719 (1968) (former testimony), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (co-con-
spirator's admission) . 
... See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence 
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1978) . 
••• Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970). Ct. State v. Napeahi, 57 Hawaii 365, 368-75, 
556 P.2d 569, 572-76 (1976) (harmless error to disallow extrinsic evidence of prior inconsis-
tent statement by prosecution witness where evidence of guilt was overwhelming). See also 
State v. El'Ayache, No. 6532 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Oct. 24, 1980) (approving trial by stipulated 
testimony of all but one prosecution witness) . 
... 409 U.S. 1132, 1133 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) . 
•• 7 Levy v. Kimball, 51 Hawaii 540, 542-43, 465 P.2d 580, 582 (1970); HAWAII R. EVID. 
804(a) commentary . 
... Hawaii R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B) (1972). 
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superseded by rule 804,11111 previously admitted depositions in this circum-
stance. Accordingly, the commentary to rule 804(a)(5) elaborates: 
It is intended that the phrase "unable to procure his attendance by process or 
other reasonable means" . '.' be construed in civil cases to allow a finding of 
unavailability where the declarant of an 804(b) statement resides on another 
island and the proponent demonstrates that procuring attendance of the de-
clarant would work undue financial hardship, considering the personal circum-
stances of the proponent and the amount in controversy in the case. 
Given the general applicability of the rules in all courts, such a ftexible 
standard seems appropriate in Hawaii. 
Assuming a proper showing of declarant's unavailability, a matter ad-
dressed to the court under rule 100(a),I80 the rule 804(b) exceptions admit 
former testimony including depositions,"1 dying declarations,I8I state-
ments against interest,18a statements of pedigree or family.history,IM and 
statements of recent perceptions.l811 The former-testimony provision is 
taken from the rule proposed by the Supreme Court in 1972.1811 It admits 
testimony or depositions given "at the instance of or against a party with 
an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect ex-
amination, with motive and interest similar to those of the party against 
whom now offered."187 Former testimony and depositions are by defini-
tion given under oath and subject to cross-examination, factors that ap-
pear to justify admitting the statements so long as the previous party, if 
someone other than the current party, had a similar motive and interest 
in offering or confronting the declarant. The rest of the 804(b) exceptions 
••• See generally Richardson, supra note 3, at 31 & n.261, 37-38 & n.326. 
no See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra. 
'01 HAWAII R. EVID. 804(b)(1) . 
••• [d. 804(b)(2). The common law admitted dying declarations only in crinlinal homicide 
cases. see MCCORMICK. supra note 47, at § 283, and federal rule 803(b)(2) admits them in 
homicide prosecutions and civil cases generally; the Hawaii rule admits them in all cases. 
Whatever one thinks of the trustworthiness of the final utterances of dying persons, there 
appears no valid reason for distinguishing among different types of litigation for admissibil-
ity purposes. Under the rule a dying declaration must relate to "the cause or circumstances 
of what ... [the declarant) believed to be his inlpending death." HAWAII R. Evm. 804(b)(2) . 
... HAWAII R. EVID. 804(b)(3). State v. Leong, 51 Hawaii 581. 587-88. 465 P.2d 560. 563-64 
(1970). anticipated the present rule by approving use of statements against penal interest; 
cf. State v. Bennett, 62 Hawaii _, 610 P.2d 502 (1978) (motive to falsify disqualified state-
ment under the exception). See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (state-
ments against penal interest offered by an accused) . 
... HAWAII R. EVID. 804(b)(4); see Apo v. Dillingham Inv. Corp., 57 Hawaii 64, 66-68, 549 
P.2d 740, 742-43 (1976) . 
••• HAWAII R. Evm. 804(b)(5). The federal rules contain no "recent perception" exception. 
but the Supreme Court's 1972 submission contained one. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2). 56 F.R.D. 
321 (1972). In addition, rule 804(b)(5) restates the holding in Hew v. Aruda, 51 Hawaii 451, 
462 P.2d 476 (1969) . 
... Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), 56 F.R.D. 321 (1972) . 
... HAWAII R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
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are unremarkable. Rule 804(b)(6) contains a catch-all provision admitting 
statements "not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" pro-
vided they meet a heightened relevance standard and are the subject of 
pretrial notice. A similar provision is found in rule 803(b)(24). 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISI9NS 
Articles IX, X, and XI, entitled "Authentication and identification," 
"Contents of writings, recordings, and photographs," and "Miscellaneous 
rules," respectively, are treated together here. Article IX, applicable 
mostly to real evidence, establishes the general requirement of authenti-
cation or identification. Rule 901(a) provides that the requirement "is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims:' As applied to tangible objects in 
general, the identification foundation requires, as Dean McCormick 
pointed out, "testimony first that the object offered is the object which 
was involved in the incident, and further that the condition of the object 
is substantially unchanged:osea As applied to writings in particular, the 
authentication requirement typically demands extrinsic proof of 
authorship. 
Rule 901(b) provides examples of proper and satisfactory identification 
evidence. Testimony of a witness, upon personal knowledge, "that a mat-
ter is what it is claimed to be'os" is the first example. Many of the illus-
trations relate specifically to document authentication: nonexpert opin-
ions on handwriting,170 expert comparisons with exemplars,lI71 public 
records,lI71 and ancient documents.us A method for authentication of tele-
... MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at § 212, at 527 (footnote omitted) (original emphasis). 
Regarding the foundational "chain of custody" requirements, compare State v. Sugimoto, 62 
Hawaii _, _, 614 P.2d 386, 392 (1980) (check was properly admitted despite incomplete 
chain-of-custody showing because the object possesses unique characteristics and was iden-
tified by three witnesses), and State v. Olivera, 57 Hawaii 339, 344-45, 555 P.2d 1199, 1202-
03 (1976) (chain-of-custody showing not required for inked fingerprint card where there was 
direct testimony of its unchanged condition and no evidence indicating tampering), with 
State v. Vance, 61 Hawaii 291, 303-04, 602 P.2d 933, 942 (1979) (where drugs or chemicals 
are involved, chain-of-custody must be proven only for period before substance was tested 
but not thereafter). See also State v. Antone, 62 Hawaii _, 615 P.2d 109 (1980) (no error in 
failure to object to admissibility of rape victim's clothes where it is reasonably certain that 
tampering did not occur) . 
••• HAWAII R. Evm. 901(b)(1). 
"0 [d. 901 (b)(2) . 
... [d. 901(b)(3) . 
••• [d. 901(b)(7) . 
••• [d. 901(b)(8). C{. Hulihee v. Heirs of Hueu, 57 Hawaii 312, 555 P.2d 495 (1976) (not 
error to exclude deeds where evidence failed to explain custody link and subsequent conduct 
of proponent repudiated genuineness of documents). 
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phone conversations is also included. IT. Rule 902, entitled "Self-authenti-
cation," sets forth a number of instances in which "[eJxtrinsic evidence of 
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required." 
Several of these concern public documents and official publications, but 
the list also includes newspapers,Jl711 trade inscriptions,1T8 and commercial 
paper.1I77 Finally, rule 903 establishes that "[t]he testimony of a subscrib-
ing witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing." 
Article X codifies and liberalizes the so-called best evidence rule.1T8 
Rule 1001 provides definitions, and rule 1002 states the essential proposi-
tion: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the 
original. . . is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by 
statute." Rule 1003, however, allows for general admissibility of "dupli-
cates," which are defined so as to include carbon copies, photographic re" 
production, and "other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce 
the original."178 Rule 1004 lists exceptions, rule 1005 governs public 
records, and rule 1006 admits summaries "of voluminous writings, record-
ings, or photographS which cannot conveniently be examined in court." 
Article XI establishes the general applicability of the evidence rules in 
"all courts of the State of Hawaii except as otherwise provided by stat-
ute."880 The exceptions include preliminary determinations of admissibil-
ity under rule 104(a),JI81 grand jury proceedings, preliminary hearings in 
criminal cases, sentencing proceedings, and proceedings before the small 
claims courts. Rule 1102 is addressed to the matter of jury instructions: 
"The court shall instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the 
facts of the case, but shall not comment upon the evidence. It shall also 
inform the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact 
and the credibility of witnesses.''UJi Rule 1102 has no federal rules 
counterpart.888 
n. HAWAII R. EVID. 901(b)(6) . 
••• [d. 902(6) . 
•• a [d. 902(7) . 
... [d. 902(9) . 
••• See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 47, at ch. 23 (1972 & Supp. 1978) . 
... HAWAII R. Evm. 1001(4). 
180 [d. 1101. 
08. See text accompanying note8 27-30 supra . 
••• Previous Hawaii law, HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 635-15, -17 (1976) (repealed 1980), author-
ized judicial comment on the evidence in criminal cases but was 8ilent about civil cases. The 
rationale for rule 1102 is that judicial comment risks casting the court in the role of an 
advocate, cf. State v. Pokini, 57 Hawaii 17, 23-26, 548 P.2d 1397, 1401-02 (1976) (no justifi-
cation for trial court's remarks demeaning defense counsel), and that adversary comment on 
evidence should suffice to elucidate the issues. See text accompanying notes 133-35 supra . 
... The Supreme Court's 1972 submission contained a rule, Fed. R. Evid. lOS, 56 F.R.D. 
199 (1972), that would have permitted the judge to sum up and comment upon the evidence 
and the credibility of witnesses. Recognizing that the rule simply restated existing federal 
law and practice, Congress struck the rule but intended not to change the practice. See 1 
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 107·2 (1979). 
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x. CONCLUSION 
The Hawaii Rules of Evidence, like any other new codification, can be 
expected to generate an initial spate of litigation as judges and practition-
ers gain familiarity with the rules and litigants test the meanings of indi-
vidual provisions. Such is the price of codification and uniformity. With 
uniformity comes predictability, and predictability ultimately will tend to 
decrease the amount of litigation at the trial and appellate levels. 
Uniformity, however, does not imply a wooden; uncritical application of 
rules to fact situations. Many of the rules, especially those pertaining to 
relevance and its counterweights, demand an informed exercise of judicial 
discretion. The rules should provide a solid framework for such decisions. 
The goal is truthseeking, and the rules were framed with this goal in 
mind. 
